Widespread power outage in Spain and Portugal
797 comments
·April 28, 2025mike_hearn
This sounds big enough to require a black start. Unfortunately, those are slow and difficult.
If an entire nation trips offline then every generator station disconnects itself from the grid and the grid itself snaps apart into islands. To bring it back you have to disconnect consumer loads and then re-energize a small set of plants that have dedicated black start capability. Thermal plants require energy to start up and renewables require external sources of inertia for frequency stabilization, so this usually requires turning on a small diesel generator that creates enough power to bootstrap a bigger generator and so on up until there's enough electricity to start the plant itself. With that back online the power from it can be used to re-energize other plants that lack black start capability in a chain until you have a series of isolated islands. Those islands then have to be synchronized and reconnected, whilst simultaneously bringing load online in large blocks.
The whole thing is planned for, but you can't really rehearse for it. During a black start the grid is highly unstable. If something goes wrong then it can trip out again during the restart, sending you back to the beginning. It's especially likely if the original blackout caused undetected equipment damage, or if it was caused by such damage.
In the UK contingency planning assumes a black start could take up to 72 hours, although if things go well it would be faster. It's one reason it's a good idea to always have some cash at home.
Edit: There's a press release about a 2016 black start drill in Spain/Portugal here: https://www.ree.es/en/press-office/press-release/2016/11/spa...
oilman
In another life I worked as an engineer commissioning oil rigs and I’ve seen how tricky even a small-scale black start can be. On a rig, we simulate total power loss and have to hand-crank a tiny air compressor just to start a small emergency generator, which then powers the compressors needed to fire up the big ~7MW main generators. It's a delicate chain reaction — and that's just for one isolated platform.
A full grid black start is orders of magnitude more complex. You’re not just reviving one machine — you’re trying to bring back entire islands of infrastructure, synchronize them perfectly, and pray nothing trips out along the way. Watching a rig wake up is impressive. Restarting a whole country’s grid is heroic.
lenerdenator
I remember talking to my ex's dad about his job, which involved planning refuels of a large nuclear-powered generation station in the Lower Midwest.
The words "it's a miracle it works at all" routinely popped up in those conversations, which is... something you don't want to hear about any sort of power generation - especially not nuclear - but it's true. It's a system basically built to produce "common accidents". It's amazing that it doesn't on a regular basis.
carlhjerpe
I love the "analog" handcranked air compressor to 7MW generator escalation, it really captures human ingenuity.
I wonder however how being part of the "continental Europe synchronous grid" affects this, and how it isolates to Portugal and Spain like this.
But yeah there are a lot of capacitors that want juice on startup that happily kills any attempt to restore power. My father had "a lot" of PA speakers at home and when we tripped the 3680w breaker (16A 220v) we had to kill some gear to get it back up again. I'm also very sure we had 230v because I lived close to the company I worked for and we ran small scale DC operations so I could monitor input voltage and frequency on SNMP so through work I had "perfect amateur" monitoring of our local grid. Just for fun I got notifications if the frequency dropped more than .1 and it happened, but rarely. Hardly ever above though since that's calibrated over time like Google handle NTP leap seconds.
I love infrastructure
tantalor
> hand-crank a tiny air compressor
Is that what Dr. Sattler is doing in this scene from Jurassic Park?
petertodd
That would be charging up the spring to throw the breaker. High voltage breakers need to switch on (or off) very quickly, to avoid damage from arcing. It's common for them to have some kind of spring or gas piston arrangement that you pump up first to give them enough energy to do that quickly.
Nice attention to detail by the filmmakers.
TheJoeMan
No, he's winding up a spring to close the circuit breaker quicker than a human hand could, which reduces/prevents and arc from forming as the electrical contacts close.
optimalsolver
Hold on to your culos.
Tireings
Ah shit now I want that panel for my dream house
zdragnar
I can appreciate the ability to revert to hand cranking an air compressor, yet I can't help but feel that the 99.99% of events, you'd be better served with keeping a two stroke gas engine ready to go. Air compressors tend to have parts just as or more vulnerable to environmental factors, and you get a lot more power for less elbow grease out of a two stroke.
oilman
In 99.99% of real-world scenarios, the rig would have other options to bootstrap a black start—like fully charged air tanks, backup power from a support vessel, or even emergency battery systems. The hand-cranked air compressor is really a last resort tool. We test it during commissioning to prove it could work, but in most cases, it’s never used again in the rig’s working life. It’s there for the rarest situations—like if a rig was abandoned during a hurricane, drifted off station, and someone somehow ended up back onboard without normal support. It’s a true "everything else failed" kind of backup.
morning-coffee
Based on how difficult it can be to start my chain-saw, snow-blower, and motorcycle after they've sat without being run for a while, I'd not recommend a gasoline-powered engine to be the only thing on stand-by.
BenjiWiebe
As an ex small engine mechanic, I'd advise against using a 2 stroke for something like that. A 4 stroke would be a better bet. Better yet would be a natural gas/propane 4 stroke, since gasoline goes stale and plugs carburetors.
Small diesels could be an option but they're harder to pull start for a given size.
Damogran6
Not being at all qualified to comment (though I work for a power company), I'd think the hand crank air compressor wouldn't suffer from no spark or bad gas.
stronglikedan
I'd rather bet on the simplicity of a glorified bicycle pump than the complexity of an engine any day, but then again, I'd probably have both!
Symbiote
A power station can start a decently large generator with batteries.
Maybe there are other concerns for an oil rig.
SoftTalker
Hand crank? I'd think something like an oil rig would have a propane or gasoline or diesel generator with an electric start and batteries.
petertodd
The point isn't to make a system that is easy. The point is to make a system that is guaranteed to work in any remotely realistic circumstance.
In a real black start, the guys might very well grab a portable generator and just use that instead. But having the option to hand crank something rather than rely on batteries that might run flat is good.
detaro
and if the entire thing depends on it, you'll give that generator a handcrank as a backup too instead of assuming the batteries ever dying or getting flooded or whatever is entirely impossible.
cybergibbons25
Black out on a rig or ship is very different to black start of a national electricity grid.
Most vessels will experience a blackout periodically and the emergency generator start fine, normally on electric or stored air start, and then the main generators will come up fine. It's really not delicate, complex or tricky - some vessels have black outs happen very often, and those that don't will test it periodically. There will also be a procedure to do it manually should automation fail.
There are air starters on some emergency generators that need handling pumping. These will also get tested periodically.
The most complex situation during black out restoration would be manual synchronisation of generators but this is nothing compared to a black start.
Vox_Leone
The fewer resources we dedicate to grid resilience and modernization, the harder black starts become. And as grids get more complex and interdependent, recovering from total failure becomes exponentially harder.
A rare but sobering opportunity to reflect on something we usually take for granted: electricity.
We live in societies where everything depends on the grid — from logistics and healthcare to communications and financial systems. And yet, public awareness of the infrastructure behind it is shockingly low. We tend to notice the power grid only when it breaks.
We’ve neglected it for decades. In many regions, burying power lines is dismissed as “too expensive.” But compare that cost to the consequences of grid collapse in extreme weather, cyberattacks, or even solar storms — the stakes are existential. High-impact, low-frequency events are easy to ignore until they’re not.
the_duke
Just to highlight this: the last significant power outage in Western/middle Europe was 2003. [1]
That's 20 years without any significant problems in the grid, apart from small localized outages.
It's not hard to start taking things for granted if it works perfectly for 20 years.
Many people don't even have cash anymore, either in their wallet or at home. In case of a longer power outage a significant part of the population might not even be able to buy food for days.
citrin_ru
> Many people don't even have cash anymore, either in their wallet or at home.
Even if you have cash many shops would not sell anything in case of a mass outage because registers are just clients which depend on a cloud to register a transaction. Not reliable but cheap when it works.
rini17
There are now ubiquitous wireless POS terminals for card payments that can be recharged from emergency sources of electricity(like cars). As long as the mobile internet works it's possible. Of course this only little alleviates the disruption.
genewitch
> a significant part of the population might not even be able to buy food for days.
And who's fault is that? Why did europe allow this?
Why will the US allow this, eventually?
roughly
Yeah, this is the turkey’s dilemma - life on a farm is a lot better than life in the wild for 51 out of the 52 weeks of the year.
Most of our modern economy and systems are built to reduce redundancy and buffers - ever since the era of “just in time” manufacturing, we’ve done our best to strip out any “fat” from our systems to reduce costs. Consequently, any time we face anything but the most idealized conditions, the whole system collapses.
The problem is that, culturally, we’re extremely short-termist- normally I’d take this occasion to dunk on MBAs, and they deserve it, but broadly as a people we’re bad at recognizing just how far down the road you need to kick a can so you’re not the one who has to deal with it next time and we’ve gotten pretty lazy about actually doing the work required to build something durable.
Xelbair
"Just in time" is a phrase I hate with vehement passion. You aren't optimizing the system, you're reducing safety marigns - and consequences are usually similar to Challanger.
This is a solution that teenager put in management position would think of(along with hire more people as solution to inefficient processes), not a paid professional.
Systems like electric grid, internal water management (anti-flood) shouldn't be lean, they should be antifragile.
What's even more annoying that we have solutions for a lot of those problems - in case of electric grids we have hydroelectric buffers, we have types of powerplants that are easier to shutdown and startup than coal, gas or wind/solar(which cannot be used for cold start at all).
The problem is that building any of this takes longer than one political term.
maxerickson
What are some examples of modern system collapse?
We've had substantial disruptions, but they've not been particularly irrecoverable or sustained.
Slava_Propanei
[dead]
pyrale
Burying lines is not a panacea, it generates massive reactance changes compared to a classic line.
jrs235
Honest question, are we better off in the long run, and is it a better solution, to decentralize energy generation and make more smaller grids rather than linking them all up? This isn't to say completely getting rid of the ability to transfer between the smaller grids to assist with power disruptions but to decouple and make it less likely for catastrophic "global" failures like this.
mhandley
With a high fraction of renewables, the reverse is probably better in the long run. The larger geographic area you connect, the less you're affected by weather systems, and the wider area you can draw dependable dispatchable power such as hydro from. But that depends on having enough grid capacity to move enough power around, which is currently a problem.
But I wonder from a reliability (or lack of cascading failures) point of view whether synchronous islands interconnected with DC interconnects is more robust than a large synchronous network?
zanellato19
It's hard to build big generators, so as we already struggle with infrastructure I don't think that's feasible, but it would be great.
null
gwbas1c
Spain is part of the largest interconnected grid in the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_Europe_Synchronous...
Does this really qualify as "black start" when they can rely on the bigger EU grid?
throwup238
Yes because they have to bring it all back up in phases so that they only face the load spike* from one interconnect at a time, which can take some time and can fail if there’s unknown damage like the GP said.
It really depends on the region though because almost all large hydroelectric dams are designed to be primary black-start sources to restore interconnects and get other power plants back up quickly in phase with the dam. i.e. in the US 40% of the country has them so it’s relatively easy to do. The hardest part is usually the messy human coordination bit because none of this stuff is automated (or possible even automatable).
* the load spike from everyone’s motors and compressors booting up at the same time
pbhjpbhj
Presumably emergency phone comms still work(?) so they could issue instructions to do a phased (heh!) restart to avoid every fridge/air conditioner/whatever restarting at once. Not sure how successful that would be however.
mike_hearn
Spain is but Portugal is only connected to Spain and they are currently doing a full black start.
For Spain the external power and synchronization can come from France rather than generators which will help, but the process and complexities are still mostly the same. Call it a dark start, perhaps.
zymhan
Presumably not
> A black start is the process of restoring an electric power station, a part of an electric grid or an industrial plant, to operation without relying on the external electric power transmission network to recover from a total or partial shutdown.[1]
throwup238
The key part of the phrase is actually "electric power station, a part of an electric grid or an industrial plant." Note how the definition doesn't include an entire grid.
Only the first power plant in a black-start (like a hydroelectric dam or gas plant started by a backup generator) is truly "black started." The rest don't fit that definition because they depend on an external power source to spin up and synchronize frequency before burning fuel and supplying any energy to the grid. If they didn't, the second they'd turn on they'd experience catastrophic unscheduled disassembly of the (very big) turbines.
Only the first power plant can come online without the external transmission network.
Havoc
Yup - a true black start would be substantially more difficult and time consuming. More like a gradual reconnect.
Then again they might be less prepared precise because of the euro grid is available
Damogran6
It's a complex enough issue that you can't really 'hand wavey' it. The details are specific and thorny.
JumpCrisscross
But not a black start.
martinald
Interestingly it seems that the black start drill is considering a smaller zone of impact than what has happened here.
Also I suspect there is far more renewables on the grid now than in 2016.
This is potentially the first real black start of a grid with high renewable (solar/wind) penetration that I am aware of. Black starts with grids like this I imagine are much more technically challenging because you have generation coming on the grid (or not coming on) that you don't expect and you have to hope all the equipment is working correctly on "(semi)-distributed" generation assets which probably don't have the same level of technical oversight that a major gas/coal/nuclear/hydro plant does.
I put in another comment about the 2019 outage which was happened because a trip on a 400kV line caused a giant offshore wind farm to trip because its voltage regulator detected a problem it shouldn't have tripped the entire wind output over.
Eg: if you are doing a black start and then suddenly a bunch of smallish ~10MW solar farms start producing and feeding back in "automatically", you could then cause another trip because there isn't enough load for that. Same with rooftop solar.
genewitch
Grid tied solar won't put power into the grid when the grid is down. It's the one reason I didn't grid tie.
Non tied solar won't affect the grid at all. So this is a non-issue.
Grid tie requires the grid to tie to, otherwise it can't synchronize. So it stays disconnected.
sponaugle
"Grid tied solar won't put power into the grid when the grid is down. It's the one reason I didn't grid tie."
Why would that prevent you from being grid-tie? I have 53 panels (~21kw) grid tied and pushing to the grid, but in the event of grid failure my panels will still operate and push into my 42kwh battery array which will power the entire house. ( The batteries take over as the 'virtual grid source). I can then augment the batteries with generator and run fully off grid for an extended amount of time ( weeks in my case ).
martinald
Youre missing my point. I know that; I mean if you are restarting the grid and say you have a segment you think has 5MW of load that will come online, but you connect it and a minute or two later suddenly 2MW of grid tied solar detects the grid and starts exporting and you now have 3MW of load it is going to make it much more tricky to balance the restart. I'm not sure how much of a problem this is in reality but it seems to me restarting a grid is made much more tricky when you have millions of generation assets with no control over.
Tireings
Those small solar panels probably go directly to the next consumer.
You need to calculate for it but I don't think this would be a problem
chippiewill
The frequency aspect of a black start is presumably a bit easier in Europe because there's an interconnected synchronous grid so they can bootstrap it from France essentially.
It's far more problematic for the UK because all the interconnects are DC.
padjo
I was recently told by an electrical engineering lecturer that the black start plan here in Ireland is to use the DC interconnectors with the UK to provide startup power to a synchronous generator.
beAbU
With the new wexford-wales interconnect that went live last month, and another one planned from Cork (?) to France things might be even easier in the near future I reckon.
ajmurmann
Did he mention the UK's plan in case they have a full blackout?
tzs
Isn't that backwards? When grids interconnect via DC wouldn't there no longer be a need for the grids to synchronize frequency?
maxerickson
With the DC interconnect, your DC to AC conversion equipment would need the capability to provide synchronized power to the generator you are trying to start. With the synchronized grid tie, your are pulling the generator into the running grid.
oliwarner
Does the source of "truth" matter? You still have to turn everything off, bring your generators up, each in sync and then allow load back on slowly.
The UK keeping its own time just makes things easier for it IMO.
wongarsu
A synchronous interconnect provides not just a source of truth but also stabilizes your grid frequency. If you have an isolated grid you have to match generation to demand to keep the grid frequency stable. If you have a 1GW interconnect that means you can mismatch generation and demand by up to a gigawatt and still be fine. I imagine that makes for a much faster startup procedure
kennysmoothx
This is literally like Factorio.
If your Factory uses too much power, theres not enough energy to run the power plants generation, which decreases your power production. Death spiraling until theres no power.
You have to disconnect the factory, and independently power your power plants back up until you have enough energy production to connect your factory up again.
shagie
Capacitor circuit network warning for alarm for "main grid is drawing on this bank - bad things may happen if capacity is not increased."
Another "trick" is those burner inserters are black start capable. They can pick up fuel and feed themselves to keep running without an electrical network.
I also tend to put Schmitt triggers in low priority areas. They've got a battery on the main grid next to them and if the battery drops below 50% power they remain off until it goes back above 75% power.
juancroldan
I've been thinking EXACTLY this while listening to FM radio for the last 7 hours (we didn't even have phone line)
eddd-ddde
In my server I hooked up a sound alarm to a set of capacitors. Too low of a charge indicates higher power consumption than production, allowing you to unplug certain low priority loads. I also have some emergency coal generators ready to go at the flick of a switch if needed.
Man I need to go play some more.
baq
They should allow you to build automatic rate-of-change-of-power-generation breakers...
abdullahkhalids
Factorio has logic circuits which allow you to do this.
floatrock
Practical Engineering did a really great video a few years ago on why black starts are hard, complete with a tabletop demo about the physics of synchronizing large spinning generators: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOSnQM1Zu4w
leomca
It seems Spain lost 15GW of load, but is still running 10GW of load: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
Would this suggest the grid hasn't snapped apart, or is it just not possible to tell from the data?
Coal, pumped hydro, and nuclear generation all went to 0 around the same time, but presumably that's those sources being disconnected from the grid to balance demand? https://transparency.entsoe.eu/generation/r2/actualGeneratio...
mike_hearn
They're definitely doing a black start:
https://x.com/RedElectricaREE/status/1916818043235164267
We are beginning to recover power in the north and south of the peninsula, which is key to gradually addressing the electricity supply. This process involves the gradual energization of the transmission grid as the generating units are connected.
I see load dropping to zero on that graph, or rather, load data disappears an hour ago.
If the grid frequency goes too far out of range then power stations trip automatically, it's not an explicit decision anyone takes and it doesn't balance load, quite the opposite. A station tripping makes the problem worse as the frequency drops even further as the load gets shared between the remaining stations, which is why grids experience cascading failure. The disconnection into islands is a defense mechanism designed to stop equipment being too badly damaged and to isolate the outage.
leomca
BBC reporting the head of Spain's electricity grid saying restoring power could take "between six and ten hours": https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/c9wpq8xrvd9t?post=asset%3A85...
leomca
Interesting, but in terms of load I think think the data may just be delayed by ~1 hour. Switching to UTC, to avoid timezone confusion, it's currently 13:10:
Last actual load value for Spain at 12:15: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
Last actual load value for France at 12:00: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
Karawebnetwork
What caused it? The Portuguese prime minister, Luís Montenegro, said that the issue originated in Spain. Portugal’s REN said a “rare atmospheric phenomenon” had caused a severe imbalance in temperatures that led to the widespread shutdowns.
REN said: “Due to extreme temperature variations in the interior of Spain, there were anomalous oscillations in the very high voltage lines (400 kV), a phenomenon known as ‘induced atmospheric vibration’. These oscillations caused synchronisation failures between the electrical systems, leading to successive disturbances across the interconnected European network.”
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/apr/28/spain-and-p...
Eduard
"Conductor gallop" is one of several proposed causes.
guerrilla
So, what you're saying is that literal bad vibes caused it... ;)
red_admiral
I'm going with: never attribute to malice what can be explained by ... an incredibly complex system that can fall over even if no-one's being stupid. I would want very strong evidence before I believe this is an attack.
There is precedent for major power outages, a huge majority of which are not malicious: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_major_power_outages
I remember the day when the Swiss railway power network went down for a day (in 2005) because one power line was down for maintenance and someone pressed the wrong button and produced a short circuit somewhere else. It's a bit like the incidents in planes were one engine has a problem and the crew shut down the other one by mistake.
hersko
I seem to recall a tree falling in Ohio knocked out the power to NYC.
Ayesh
A monkey took out the whole grid in Sri Lanka this year
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/13/asia/sri-lanka-power-outa...
htrp
> The animal had come into contact with the transformer at the station, disrupting supply to the entire country. There were no immediate details on whether the monkey survived the incident.
hirako2000
If that's all it took to turn Srilanka off.Even if that country lags behind western Europe, what would it take for a few humans who intentionally cut off power.
Trying to stay on the facts, this incident is likely accidental but some people even the very workers at energy companies could send a message for, I don't know. A pay raise?
jcranmer
That wasn't tree falling in Ohio, that was overloaded line sagged and shorted into a tree, compounded with several other factors that contributed to the grid instability and the inability of the grid operator to realize how unstable the grid was.
scoot
"Same difference" to use an Irish turn of phrase. If a short to ground takes out power to an extensive area does it mater what touched what?
bobthepanda
There was also a race condition in some management software that hadn’t tripped in over thirty years of usage.
Wobbles42
The tree had malicious intent. You can't convince me otherwise.
jpmattia
Can you blame them? Just look at how they've been treated in the last few hundred years.
riskable
They've had a grudge against humanity since the fall. Ever since—once a year—they send a clear message, "leaf" but do the humans listen? No.
null
padjo
“induced atmospheric vibration” on 400KV lines is the current theory
CGMthrowaway
Probably didn't help that before the outage hit, Spain was running its grid with very little dispatchable spinning generation, and therefore not much inertia.
Solar PV/thermal + wind: ~78%
Nuclear: 11.5%
Co-generation: 5%
Gas-fired: ~3% (less than 1GW)
pjc50
> Solar PV/thermal + wind: ~78%
This is (a) incredibly impressive to achieve and (b) definitely the point at which the battery infrastructure needs to catch up in order to reduce the risk of such incidents.
JumpCrisscross
> very little dispatchable spinning generation
Makes the case for favouring flywheels over batteries.
JensRantil
I would _love_ to understand more about how this atmospheric state impacted the vibration of power lines. Sounds exotic.
williamscales
I’m no expert but I think it has to do with this effect: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vortex-induced_vibration
See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeolian_harp
Edit: might be a completely different kind of oscillation than I was thinking of. https://news.sky.com/story/spain-portugal-power-outage-lates...
So I would also like to understand how this works :)
null
red_admiral
Update: BBC news says something something hot weather, EU council says it doesn't look like a cyber attack.
LeonM
As confirmed by António Costa (President of the European Council) on X: https://x.com/eucopresident/status/1916859055546544517
switch007
Hot weather? Huh? It's spring
rawgabbit
Having lived through the Texas electricity fiasco in 2021, I would blame cost cutting, the reckless drive for “efficiency”, and maximizing shareholder value.
In Texas, the electric providers cut staff and maintenance to maximize shareholder value. They will not have redundant systems and redundant plants out of the goodness of their hearts. The Texas marketplace actually allowed them in the odd event of an outage to charge astronomical spot prices thinking this will incentivize them to have redundant systems. This was a foolish fantasy.
Now in Texas, discussion of how to cost share redundancy have taken place. But no one wants to pay for it. https://www.texastribune.org/2023/03/01/texas-power-market-p...
fbn79
Not many month ago the Italians trains was disrupted by a single nail into a cable: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-rail-services-d...
alickz
>an incredibly complex system that can fall over even if no-one's being stupid
I only have a layman's understanding of power grids, but I thought they were incredibly hardened, with backups and contingencies in depth
Are the grids at this scale really this brittle? Would there be a death toll from this?
I also wouldn't blame malice without corroborating evidence
slightwinder
> but I thought they were incredibly hardened, with backups and contingencies in depth
Some are harder than others, and some have random flaws which nobody can really predict.
Spain seems in the transition to renewables, so it's possible that they have some flaws because they are still in the process, or because it's something which never happened before and is unknown territory. Also, Spain had some economic problems in the last decade, maybe someone build to cheap or was even cheating somewhere.
> Are the grids at this scale really this brittle? Would there be a death toll from this?
Hospitals should have backup-systems. Traffic should be able to stop in time. I guess the most problematic parts are people stuck in elevators and other spaces which only open electrical, as also the loss of cellular phone-connections for calling helpers.
bonzini
Hardening focuses first on not damaging equipment and second on providing energy. If things go wrong quickly enough you don't have time to react, because after a power plant disconnects you get sudden bumps in load that can trigger a chain failure near the original point. The last time it happened in Europe was in 2003, which isn't too shoddy.
belter
> were one engine has a problem and the crew shut down the other one by mistake.
So frequent it even has its own wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Airliner_accidents_an...
JimBlackwood
Or that time in 2003 when a tree fell on a power line in Switzerland and all of Italy ended up without electricity.
yannvon
I experienced it first hand in Madrid. This was much scarier than I would have imagined.
News travelled extremely slow: phone coverage was just barely enough to receive a couple text messages every 15 minutes or so. News spread on the street, I even saw a group of 20 people hunched around someone owning a hand-held radio in the streets.
Just before power was restored, things started to get worse, as the phone coverage went completely out (presumably batteries were depleted). People were in between enjoying the work-free day, and starting to worry about how tomorrow would look like if power didn't come back.
MisterTea
When the northeast blackout hit in 2003 in NYC I dont remember any panic. We still had house phones and they still worked in the blackout thanks to telcos being legally obligated to give a shit about reliability.
I stopped by a friends house and we then went on a walk. Some stores were open and cash was accepted. We hung out later that night and had a few beers. The sky was amazing as there was next to no light pollution. Next day was totally in the dark as well and again, no panic. More beers were enjoyed.
The choice to move to electronic everything without having to give a shit about reliability is a failure of modern government. Move fast and break society for a dollar.
toast0
> thanks to telcos being legally obligated to give a shit about reliability.
Yeah, they don't need to do that anymore. Around me, enough towers have battery backups that I can count on 2 hours of coverage when utility power goes out (if it goes out late at night or early morning, there's usually coverage until 6-7 am when people start waking up and use up the rest of the power). I don't have a real landline, but the telco DSL would drop instantly with utility power so I don't have big hopes and I wasn't willing to pay $60/month to find out.
Around when I moved, stores would pull out the credit card imprint machines, but those don't work anymore because cards are flat. Cash might work, and I've got some, but I don't think many people in my community do; people don't have cash for the snack shack we run at my kid's sports, so I doubt they have it for restaurants and stores either. And we get frequent 2-4 hour power outages, at least one, usually two or three per year; and ~ 24 hour outages every few years. The snack shack runs during summer where electricity is most reliable, but I doubt people stock up on cash in the fall and use it all up before spring/summer; they probably just don't have any.
lxgr
> stores would pull out the credit card imprint machines, but those don't work anymore because cards are flat
It's the other way around: Cards are flat because a carbon imprint doesn't afford the merchant any payment guarantee by the card issuer anymore anyway. (In other words, the "floor limit" above which cards require electronic authorization is now zero.)
Kkoala
That sounds like the sensible reaction, at the time at least.
It's interesting to think about and realize how much things have changed now though, and how reliant people are on everything, and especially their tiktoks etc. working all the time.
Some of the panic is likely related to the war in Europe too, and especially the general talk about war
MisterTea
> Some of the panic is likely related to the war in Europe too, and especially the general talk about war
We were just two years removed from 9/11 so terror talk was the first thing that happened. We got that news from AM radio in our cars. Still no panic.
moonlanders
Similar experience in a town in Madrid's metropolitan area.
Electricty went down (something kind of frequent). My UPS kept PC up, and alarm system with sim and small UPS mantained wifi up for an hour or so.
Scary moments started when people I was in a call with in Portugal texted 'Grid is out'. Later no phone signal nor data.
At first, it might seem people running towards supermarkets an overreaction on being without TikTok for a couple of hours, but you have to live how scary it is to experience this in Europe's current political status to know 60 million people (plus industry) in three countries are out of the grid.
If you see Snowden's film (this might not be the most trustworthy source) it is exactly how CIA's agent describes the feasable attack towards these countries. Again, not a valid source, but I'd love to understand if that could be feasable.
sebastiennight
I think this is where F-droid and Briar have a (short-lived in this instance) chance to shine. Since Briar allows communication between phones without access to the Internet, and F-droid allows to direct transmit apps between phones as well.
I wonder what similar solutions exist in the iOS ecosystem.
tux3
You can see the crash on the ENTSO-E live data: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/generation/r2/actualGeneratio...
Three quarter of the production disconnects from the grid between 12:30 and 13:00, with only a bit of solar and onshore wind sticking around.
leomca
Spain loses around 15GW of demand at the same time: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
I don't think we're able to tell from the data if one is the cause of the other, are we? Since if production was lost, load would have to be shedded to balance the grid, and if load was lost (e.g. due to a transmission failure), production would have to be disconnected to balance the grid.
pjc50
Report on a smaller event in the UK: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/investigation-9-august... (see linked pdf)
That started from a combination of a lightning strike and generator trip, but turned into a local cascade failure as lots of distributed generation noticed that the frequency was under 49Hz and disconnected itself. I suspect the Spanish situation will be similar - inability to properly contain a frequency excursion, resulting in widespread generator trips.
(I suspect this is going to restart a whole bunch of acrimony about existing pain points like grid maintenance, renewables, domestic solar, and so on, probably with the usual suspects popping up to blame renewables)
cesarb
> probably with the usual suspects popping up to blame renewables
Renewables were a factor in the blackout here in Brazil a couple of years ago: the models used by the system operator did not correspond to reality, many solar and wind power plants disconnected on grid disturbances quicker than specified. That mismatch led the system operator to allow a grid configuration where a single fault could lead to a cascade (more power was allowed through a power line than could be redistributed safely if that power line shut off for any reason), and that single fault happened when a protection mechanism misbehaved and disconnected that power line. The main fix was to model these solar and wind power plants more conservatively (pending a more detailed review of their real-life behavior and the corresponding update of the models), which allowed them to correctly limit the power going through these power lines.
If you want an excruciating level of detail, the final 614-page report is at https://www.ons.org.br/AcervoDigitalDocumentosEPublicacoes/R... (in Portuguese; the main page for that incident is at https://www.ons.org.br/Paginas/Noticias/Ocorr%c3%aancia-no-S...).
xenadu02
This is why solar requires redundant data links to the operator in CA now. Mine has it. During instability they can command my system to accept larger voltage and frequency excursions than would normally be allowed to prevent a "pile-on" where an excursion causes solar to make the problem worse.
scoot
Is 50Hz really that important these days – i.e. more important than maintaining power? (Honest naive question.)
terom
Portugal has an even bigger relative drop in load, from 5852MW at 11:00 hours -> 613MW at 13:00 hours - these seem like 1 hour averages.
[1] https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
rcarmo
Apparently a local grid overload near France and a cascading failure down the Spanish network, but radio and newspapers don’t agree on root cause. Of course there is a lot of noise.
For instance, one reporter asked one of the government flunkies whether it could be a cyberattack and they turned his noncommittal “maybe, we don’t know” into “government says cyberattack may be ongoing”.
Be careful of idiot reporters out there.
Edit: I’m listening to another radio interview where they are outlining the plans to bring online Portuguese dams and thermal generators over the next few hours, progressively unplugging from the Spanish supply (fortunately we have enough of those, apparently).
It should take 3-4 hours to get everything balanced with only national supplies, and they will restore power from North to South.
martinald
Yes, something similar happened in the UK a while back. Full info here: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2020/01/9_...
Key points that started it were (you can see the chain of events in the doc):
2.4.1. At 16:52:33 on Friday 9 August 2019, a lightning strike caused a fault on the Eaton Socon – Wymondley 400kV line. This is not unusual and was rectified within 80 milliseconds (ms)
2.4.2. The fault affected the local distribution networks and approximately 150MW of distributed generation disconnected from the networks or ‘tripped off’ due to a safety mechanism known as vector shift protection
2.4.3. The voltage control system at the Hornsea 1 offshore wind farm did not respond to the impact of the fault on the transmission system as expected and became unstable. Hornsea 1 rapidly reduced its power generation or ‘deloaded’ from 799MW to 62MW (a reduction of 737MW).
ethbr1
Curious question for someone familiar with power at grid-scale -- How granular is load shedding? And how is this measured / tracked?
In my head, I'm thinking of generators/plants, connected by some number of lines, to some amount of load, where there are limited disconnection points on the lines.
So how do grid operators know what amount of load will be cut if they disconnect point A123 (and the demand behind it) vs point B456?
Is this done sort-of-blind? Or is there continual measurement? (e.g. there's XYZ MW of load behind A123 as of 2:36pm)
pxdm
I can speak for the GB case. Low Frequency Demand Disconnection (LFDD) occurs automatically and in stages when the frequency drops until it stabilises. The substations or feeders that are tripped off are not currently determined by real-time metering - instead they are pre-allocated based on their typical demand. This means that the system operator does not really know how much demand will be disconnected at any given time. If it's sunny, you could easily trip off a lot of solar generation connected on the low voltage network, causing the frequency to drop further. It is far from optimal!
martinald
They don't really disconnect it like that in these circumstances (as in they choose what to disconnect). As far as I know generation plants will start disconnect when grid frequency is <49Hz or >51Hz (at least in the UK) automatically as it's all starting to go very wrong. This is what causes this huge cascade effect. Roughly speak less frequency means there is more demand than supply and the other way round for higher frequencies.
This has changed a lot though, as even home batteries afaik will start discharging if they start noticing the frequency dropping to provide some support on generation. But if it's dropping too fast and too quickly it won't help.
But yes they do have very granular info on all the HV sources and how much load is on them.
Beretta_Vexee
Load shedding is an active measure taken when the grid operator knows that it will not be able to balance supply and demand. This is what happens in South Africa, where the operator preventively disconnects parts of the network at predetermined times to ensure network balance. As this is programmed, it is possible to rotate the areas under blackout.
In this case, we are dealing with a widespread grid incident. The various grid protection mechanisms have been triggered to prevent interconnection overload. In addition, the generators are trying to correct the grid frequency to exactly 50Hz. At 49Hz, more power must be generated; at 51Hz, less power must be generated. However, if the frequency varies too much, there are also protection mechanisms to prevent the turbines from overspeeding or amplifying frequency variations.
The grid is complex, and normally this type of incident is limited to one cell of the electricity distribution grid. A blackout is a domino effect, when a minor event triggers a chain reaction that disconnects more and more elements from the grid.
Th grid operator will have to restart or reconnect the power plants one by one, restore power to stations and sub stations. All of this must be done in a specific order before power can be restored to consumers. All of this takes time, requires resources (you need men on the ground), and the slightest error can lead to further outages.
Some consumers are prioritised, such as hospitals, transport infrastructure, telecoms and water networks. Many critical pieces of equipment have UPS systems, but these are not always designed for such long outages or have not been tested for years. There are patients with home equipment who will struggle.
This is why rotating load shedding is preferable. The outages are not too long and vital infrastructure is not affected (or less so).
rpastuszak
I was going to say something similar. I live in Portugal and I've heard a lot of panic/fear mongering, mainly from the techies in the co-working space I was working on and expats.
(apologies for singling out these specific groups of people - my point is that it might be worth to put down news sources like xitter, and read AP/translated local Portuguese news)
divan
"xitter" in Portugese would be pronounced as "shee-tehr", right?
amanaplanacanal
That's how some have been pronouncing it in English, too.
dark-star
I can only imagine the "fun" in getting those synced back up to the European grid once this is all over... That alone will take weeks
aaron695
[dead]
tiborsaas
You can track the outage with CloudFlare's traffic radar page too:
https://radar.cloudflare.com/es?dateRange=1d
https://radar.cloudflare.com/pt?dateRange=1d
Portugal nearly reached zero.
jslakro
A fire in the south-west of France, which damaged a high-voltage power line has also been identified as a possible cause:
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/04/28/spain-portugal...
Rygian
A power outage in 2021 was ultimately traced to a firefighting hydroplane that damaged a high-voltage transmission line in southern France.
The similarity between that event and this early-on report is striking.
[es language]: https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/espana/2021/07/24/aver...
oersted
I'm seeing some reports saying that a significant frequency oscillation happened, which triggered automatic shut-downs, which cascaded. Could an event like this have that effect?
I suppose it makes sense that it was an automatic shutdown rather than infrastructure failing on such a wide area. And then once it's shut down, a black-start is a logistical challenge as other comments have explained.
I'm also seeing some reports about it being more likely that something happened on the east side, somewhere like the Ebro valley or north across the Pyrenees. Catalonia seems to have been particularly affected, and it's on the path of important lines coming from France. High heat at noon could have caused a line to fail and short against a tree, which would be similar to the 2003 nation-wide outage in Italy.
wongarsu
The grid is supposed to tolerate any single failure, even under full load. Of course sometimes the first failure is a fire or equipment malfunction and the second failure is a planning failure or someone pressing the wrong button.
AdamN
Grey failures are harder for large systems to handle. If a chunk goes hard down that's usually easy. Something like voltage oscillations that trigger cascading failures in a sequence can lead to negative feedback loops that bring it all down.
yaantc
From Le Monde live feed, RTE (French electricity network manager) declared the issue unrelated to this fire.
"Le gestionnaire français souligne par ailleurs que cette panne n’est pas due à un incendie dans le sud de la France, entre Narbonne et Perpignan, contrairement à des informations qui circulent."
tejohnso
Surely there is more than 0 redundancy so that one power line failure would never result in this level of catastrophe.
pixl97
Redundant systems have failures in one path quite often that you never know anything about. We get headlines when the failures correlate in the same timeslot.
jcranmer
The 2003 US Northeast blackout was caused by the failure of only a few lines that shorted into trees. These line failures created grid instability that resulted, ~5 minutes later, in most of the Northeast losing power in a cascading failure.
matkoniecz
> one power line failure would never result in this level of catastrophe.
Called N-1 criterion. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(electrical_grid)#...
And it depends. During https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_European_blackout N-1 criterion was supposed to be holding, in practice not even N-0 was holding and network crashed.
Few years ago nearly entire day European network was sitting on N-0 due to multiple issues in Poland, caused by a heat wave and deeper root causes. There are many power plants and power lines where any further issue would cause Europe-wide blackout.
pjc50
How very California.
mistrial9
you are right, but the emphasis could use a tune-up. In California, home of world-leading tech.. there are sensors and information networks, extensive electrical power lines, heavy equipment and budgets, a lot of dry and dead tress, a history of fire. So you see that California in a way is a world-quality testing lab. and the way the information travels, and the way the information is applied, could also be world-quality .. or, world-theater for government imbecility..
InDubioProRubio
Warming world is so hot right now..
terom
It looks like the Iberian peninsula is relatively isolated from the rest of the CESA synchronous grid, with only 2% cross-border capacity compared to local generation. [1]
There's a map at [2]
> The Spanish electricity system is currently connected to the systems of France, Portugal, Andorra and Morocco. The exchange capacity of this interconnection is around 3 GW, which represents a low level of interconnection for the peninsula. The international interconnection level is calculated by comparing the electricity exchange capacity with other countries with the generation capacity or installed power.
[1] https://www.ree.es/en/ecological-transition/electricity-inte...
brohee
Edit : I was misreading the confusing Rte site... Entsoe actually a lot more readable. France went from importing to exporting around the incident.
https://www.rte-france.com/eco2mix/les-echanges-commerciaux-...
https://transparency.entsoe.eu/transmission-domain/physicalF...
terom
That graph doesn't seem to make a very clear distinction between historical, real-time and predicted values... I think the event happened at 12:30 local time or so.
There seems to be some kind of recurrent daily pattern where the French - Spanish interconnect switches from Spain -> France imports to France -> Spain exports at around that time, and then back again in the late afternoon.
leomca
Yes, France was importing 884MW from Spain at 12:45, 198MW at 13:00, no net flow at 13:15, and Spain has been importing up to 265MW since: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/transmission-domain/physicalF...
nottorp
4 years ago this almost happened:
https://gridradar.net/en/blog/post/underfrequency_january_20...
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/day-europes-power-grid-almost...
https://www.acer.europa.eu/news/continental-europe-electrici...
I remember it because power went out in at least 1/3 of Romania back then.
input_sh
A similar thing happened last June, with Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, and most of the Croatian coastline losing power simultaneously.
Definitely felt surreal to first lose power to the degree that even traffic lights were no longer working, and then to hear it's also happening across the region just before mobile networks also went offline.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/power-blackout-hits-mon...
~90 page report: https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-c... (beware: PDF)
ptsneves
It shows that even when the original issues are solved the reboot takes time due to power station being spooled down due to excessive production. I hope it is all back before telecoms start draining the batteries, otherwise things get uglier
nacnud
There's a map of realtime load flow here: https://gridradar.net/en/wide-area-monitoring-system (currently shows Spain and Portugal as 'offline')
leomca
The best source for data seems to be the European grid operator themselves: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/dashboard/show
Spain's demand: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/load-domain/r2/totalLoadR2/sh...
Spain's generation: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/generation/r2/actualGeneratio...
Spain's import/export with France: https://transparency.entsoe.eu/transmission-domain/physicalF...
The filters can be used to see similar data for Portugal
fulafel
Interesting that the recovery (edit: of load graph) is going at relatively steady 600 MW/hour, it will be a while if the pace continues the same way.
pjc50
Almost certainly being coordinated at that rate by adding one plant at a time, then a load region, then checking stability is holding, and so on.
mrtksn
Are you sure "offline" means that? Romania looks offline and when I checked their CNN they were reporting live from Spain about the blackout without mentioning Romania.
nacnud
The map seems to be based on monitoring stations in the different locations, so yes - it's also possible that a station is offline for other reasons (maintenance, etc).
rcarmo
They were probably put offline as the network is rebalanced. That just means they (Romania) don’t contribute to the network.
nottorp
Our government said we're fine with our local generation and are even exporting 200 MW (possibly to our eastern neighbors?).
I definitely had no problems with electricity all of today (on the eastern side). And there was nothing in the news about local outages either.
Funny enough, there were news before the Easter holidays that they're preparing for extremely reduced demand by shutting down facilities.
amarcheschi
10 mins ago Malaga was online, now it's offline. It doesn't look promising
sofixa
Might just be lag?
In any case, if I recall correctly from a Youtube video I can't find (it was either Wendover or Real Engineering), if the grid is fully down, it takes quite a lot of effort and time to bring it back online because it has to be done in small steps to avoid over/under loading/using.
trollied
It was Practical Engineering. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOSnQM1Zu4w
Very good video. Very good channel.
amarcheschi
Idk, it might be updated with some lag
pandemic_region
Romania seems offline as well now?
steanne
now mannheim shows offline
celso
Portugal has no electricity as we speak. Funny enough telcos and 4G/5G are fine for now, I'm guessing batteries and diesel backups kicked in and are doing their job.
karohalik
There is still no electricity, at least in my neighborhood in Lisbon. Less noise, more human voices outside. Time to meet some more neighbors I guess.
karohalik
Update: still no electricity, 4G/5G is barely working, city is more chaotic than usual but not that dramatic as some media say - there are huge queues to the buses and smaller shops that are still working, more people are outside.
rcarmo
Yeah, we just told you that via Signal - that’s how we built the networks :)
(No relation to the other infamous Signal chat :))
There should be 4-8 hours of battery backup on every site - at least.
ethbr1
Wow! Battery capacity has gotten cheap.
It's always fascinated me during disasters how independent telecomm can be. Kudos for all the engineering that went into it!
I.e. even when any other conceivable dependency is down, the networks keep running.
myself248
Old-school PSTN folks looked at XKCD 705 and chuckled. Late to the party, pal.
The telephone network was designed from the ground up to be completely independent of _everything_ except fuel deliveries. If grid power is up, that's convenient, but it's totally not required.
In many places, that's because telegraph and telephone lines got there before the power grid did. Lines running along railroads connected communities that had no centralized power generation. Delco-light plants at individual farms might be the only electric power for miles, aside from the communications lines themselves. Even if the only phone was at the rail depot, it still had to power itself somehow. As those communities sprouted their own telephone offices and subscriber lines branching throughout town, the office had its own batteries for primary power, and eventually generators to recharge them. (Telegraph networks largely ran from just batteries, recharged chemically rather than with generators, for years.)
Fast-forward a century and there was just never a need to depend on anything else. As long as the diesel bowser can get down the driveway, the office can run indefinitely.
Among old AT&T/Bell/WECo hands, the devotion to reliable service goes far beyond fanatical. Many offices built during the cold-war have showers in the basement and a room of shelf-stable food, though these are no longer maintained. The expectation was that whoever was in the office when the bombs dropped, would keep things running as long as they could. And when they couldn't anymore, well, there was probably nobody left to call anyway.
p_l
Depending on country there are sometimes very strict requirements - or just traditions sometimes - around building up strong survivability in face of total loss of grid power. Including diesel and turbine generators on bigger BTSes let alone exchanges. If you drop capacity per terminal (so bandwidth) you can cover a lot more range at times which helps with mobile network resiliency.
yreg
> we just told you that via Signal
Who are you and what's Signal?
miohtama
Most base station masts have lead battery backup up to 24h - 48h.
All of Spain is without energy. All systems have shut down immediately and are not coming back. Apparently the same has happened in Portugal.