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Scammed out of $130K via fake Google call, spoofed Google email and auth sync

barbazoo

> Be skeptical of unknown calls. If something feels off, hang up and restart the conversation by contacting the company directly.

I wonder sometimes how many scams I've avoided simply by pretty much never answering my phone when someone calls unless I'm expecting a call or it's someone I know.

> The attacker already had access to my Gmail, Drive, Photos — and my Google Authenticator codes, because Google had cloud-synced my codes.

Ugh, google

arethuza

I usually don't answer calls from numbers I don't recognise - but a couple of days back it was a scammer claiming to be from Amazon - said I had ordered an iPhone for £600 and was it a real order.

I was pretty suspicious but thought I would get them to authenticate their identity as someone really from Amazon by telling me the last thing I had really ordered was...

I must have stayed on the call for 20 minutes, eventually they ended up swearing at me - all the time I could hear other people in the same room trying the same lines on different people. I have no idea why I stayed on for so long....

zamadatix

Would (the actual) Amazon even agree to provide this kind of information over the phone to someone?

mmmlinux

is talking to amazon on the phone at all even actually possible?

crawftv

The biggest red flag in all these stories is getting a call from a customer support person trying to help you. When it seems like it’s impossible to get ahold of them in a real emergency.

fkskammerz

It doesnt seem to be a red-flag. The caller was calling as an Attorney from Google General Counsel responding to an estate request. They followed up with a spoofed @google.com email with their name corroborating the call.

atm3ga

I've set my phone to not answer unknown callers (those not in my address list) and more importantly, I've done this for my parents as well and further instruct them as often as possible to not believe anything they get in email. With all of this, my mom still will reach out at least once or twice a year in a panic about some scam email she thinks is real.

general1465

Well easy to say, but if you are working in the real world, then unknown callers may be important - i.e. FedEx trying to push your package through the customs and if they can not contact you, your package goes either back or is destroyed.

atlanta90210

If you have an iPhone, the latest iOS 26 will answer unknown numbers not in your address book for you and ask what they want and then alert you to see if you want to take the call.

throwaway7783

I didn't quite understand this part. Attacked has access to Google accounts because Google had cloud-synced my codes? What does that mean?

remus

They gained access to the Google account by stealing the verification code over the phone, but then they had easy access to other accounts (e.g. coinbase) because they had access to 2FA codes because Google authenticator was backed up to the users Google account.

throwaway7783

Ah, makes sense. The victim was social engineered first.

riffraff

The other way around.

The attacker had access to the Google account which includes passwords from Chrome and also the 2fa codes stored in Google Authenticator, because those were synced to Google without the author noticing it.

So with passwords and 2fa the attacker could login to Coinbase too.

paleotrope

I have a 1-2 second rule. I pick up I say hello, if someone doesn't respond in 1-2 seconds, I hang up.

They have the scammers working off phone queues, it takes a little bit of time to get the call to the scammer, who has to start off with a script, so there's a delay.

Remember, the scammer, also likely not a native english speaker, also probably bored out of their mind, has to spin up, they have to read the name, understand how to say it and then say it out loud. Their is a mental startup time that a normal conversation doesn't have.

If someone calls you and isn't ready to immediately respond to "hello" it's a scammer.

zamadatix

I try to avoid picking up and saying anything because it seems like an advertisement "yes, this number is not only active but a real person who answers random calls - try calling back (possibly from a different number) later".

golan

As of late, I have one rule: Any unknown number I'm not expecting I let it go to voicemail, where I have a message along the lines of: leave your message and your number, and if it's important I'll call you back. The only time I pick up is when I am expecting, say, a delivery, or a doctor's call, etc, and in those cases I'm only expecting to hear about a delivery or a doctor's call, etc. Hoping that can filter and help on this front.

wcoenen

Thanks for sharing. I already had it in the back of my mind that this cloud sync thing in Google Authenticator was not very secure. I'm getting rid of it right now.

I do see why Google did it; it's going to be difficult to educate users to always set up 2FA both on a primary and a backup device. Much easier and convenient to automatically sync different devices. But your story makes it obvious that something isn't quite right here.

jgilias

Authy has solved this though. The cloud sync is opt-in, and encrypted with a password. This makes it immensely more involved to compromise.

QuadmasterXLII

The load bearing question is, why didn't the attacker also clear out OP's bank account, retirement savings, and max out his credit cards? Unfortunately, the difference is that banks care literally at all about their customers accounts being emptied.

QuadmasterXLII

What I specifically mean by "care literally at all" : banks have a policy of reimbursing people who had their accounts emptied despite taking reasonable precautions. This creates sane, linear incentives: banks care 1000x more about a $100,000 fraud than a $100 fraud; they care 1000x more about a scam affecting 100 people than a scam affecting one person, etc.

Unrelated, but for added spice, here's a thread from ten months where everyone agrees you're a fool unless you secure your coinbase account with google authenticator

https://www.reddit.com/r/CoinBase/comments/1h65zuh/account_h...

thrill

In my actual real world experience of digging my elderly mother out of $25,000+ of scam debt, banks do not care at all unless they can be shown to be at fault, and then they weigh the loss expense vs the likely legal expense.

3D30497420

This is one of the main reasons I don't like crypto. If you get hacked, even if you did everything right, then you're out of luck. The funds are (generally) unrecoverable.

With my bank, I've been able to recover several thousand after a thief was able to bypass the 2FA app used to verify large transfers. (I still don't know how they were able to bypass the verification, and after investigating our bank never told us. Not sure that makes me feel all warm and fuzzy, but at least I was made whole with minimal fuss.)

calmbell

And transferring money from a bank or brokerage account takes time. Enough time that anyone paying attention should be able to report the transfer as fraudulent before it completes and have the account frozen.

bdangubic

the banks don’t give two shits about it :)

fn-mote

The difference is that you have leverage to force the banks to care.

There isn't any federal regulation at all covering your Bitcoin.

wmf

Bitcoin exchanges like Coinbase are regulated by the CFTC in the US. This case is more of a Google problem though.

thrill

Fraud is fraud. There’s plenty of laws against it.

Imnimo

I notice none of the pieces of advice are "don't keep a hundred thousand dollars in a Coinbase account".

atm3ga

I split my crypto assets between Coinbase and what is now a corrupted hard-drive I've yet to recover.

quantified

Mistake cost him 80k. Author is feeling burnt, but the cost is the cost at transaction time.

saaaaaam

Extending this further, based on the stated value it looks like he probably had 40 or 50 ethereum. He might have bought them for a fraction of today's price - say $50 - so might only be out $2500 based on cost at transaction time...

shocks

Incorrect. Author may not have had the required savings to rebuy the position he wanted.

rwmj

Does anyone know how the email from (or appearing to be from) @google.com works? Wouldn't the Apple account reject it because it fails DKIM/etc?

fastest963

Yeah, I don't understand how it passed DMARC and why it wasn't rejected immediately by his mail server (Apple Mail?).

youngtaff

From the article he uses gmail I think

neuronflux

They probably sent it from gmail which would pass the SPF check (google.com and gmail.com have the same SPF). They wouldn't have it signed to pass DKIM, but google doesn't use strict alignment checking so to pass DMARC either SPF or DKIM are acceptable.

    ~ dig _dmarc.google.com txt +short
  "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com"

traceroute66

> Wouldn't the Apple account reject it because it fails DKIM/etc?

Yeah, I would be curious to see the actual email headers of what was received.

As an aside, fun fact, this would not be possible with @apple.com because Apple employees have old-school S/MIME signatures as an additional security layer.

rolph

How Email Spoofing Exploits SPF and DMARC: A Cybersecurity Deep Dive.

https://undercodetesting.com/how-email-spoofing-exploits-spf...

davidscoville

I’ve heard scammers use Google tools like Google forms or Google cloud to send out fraudulent emails that appear like they come from Google.

thrill

The latest attempted scams I’m getting on my gmail account are fake postmaster bounces “from” google.com.

fkskammerz

I use gmail and i was attacked almost identically and the email came thru to my gmail with a @google origin account

calmbell

The key takeaway from this imo should be to not use Google Password Manager or a password manager without a secret key like 1Password.

sequin

How did they get the passwords to his Google and Coinbase accounts? He reused passwords? The same one for Google as for Coinbase? Or did they reset his Coinbase password via his Gmail? The post doesn't make this explicit, but it warns against password reuse.

davidscoville

I believe they logged into coinbase with Google SSO. And then they used my Google Authenticator codes which were cloud synced as the second factor auth method.

A warning to auth engineers: if an account is using a Gmail address, then auth codes from Google Authenticator should not be considered a second factor.

avree

This isn't something "auth engineers" can control, there's no magic Google Authenticator flag on a 2fa code - it's all HMAC and numbers, you don't know if the code came from Authy, Google Auth, a homebrew code generator, a dongle, etc.

em500

Google/Chrome Password Manager?

IncreasePosts

But how did they get his Gmail password in the first place?

I'm not sure if I have the same password reset flow as OP, but when I try to reset my password and even provide the 2fa code, it basically doesn't let me get past a certain point without contacting my backup email address or making me use a phone which I'm logged in on to complete the reset

nzeid

> Google enabled Authenticator cloud sync by default.

Never understood this convenience and never will. This is exactly the wrong way to deal with people losing their authenticator secrets.

ninalanyon

Always confirm such things by calling the official contact number that you already have and asking about the case. Do this before you discuss the matter further.

Never act based solely on an unsolicited telephone call or email.

blueflow

If someone calls and claims to be from an big tech company, its is always a scam and you are going to loose money.

RandomBacon

Coinbase STILL doesn't freeze user accounts for a token amount of time, 24 hours or so, after resetting a password‽

Part of the blame should be levied on Coinbase if this is the case.

(I'm assuming this guy at least uses unique passwords...)

riffraff

The attacker had the passwords and 2fa codes from the Google account so Coinbase couldn't really distinguish them from the right person (tho presumably for large transfers they may require some extra checks, dunno)

RandomBacon

The article is poorly written and not clear. It sounds like you're suggesting the author let Chrome save his Coinbase password and Google synced that to the attacker as well?

> Google had cloud-synced my codes.

> That was the master key. Within minutes, he was inside my Coinbase account.

The author wrote "codes", not "passwords".

layman51

Can someone please explain to me what it means for authenticator codes to be “cloud-synced”? Is that solely dependent on whether you’re using the Google Authenticator app while signed in to your Google Account? Is it possible to not have them “cloud-synced” if you are signed in?

jazzyjackson

Google Authenticator app defaults to backing up the TOTP secrets so if you log in on a new device you have them there. Pretty poor default for security, and you can disable it, but not the first time I've heard of this biting someone.

nipponese

The risk of not syncing — when you lose/reset your phone, so does your OTP app. If you don't have backup codes saved, you're cooked.

traceroute66

> The risk of not syncing — when you lose/reset your phone, so does your OTP app. If you don't have backup codes saved, you're cooked.

Most clued-up places enable you to register a Yubikey as 2FA.

So then it doesn't matter if you loose your OTP app and your backup codes because you've still got a Yubikey.

(And those that don't allow Yubikey, almost certainly will have SMS as a secondary option).

Sayrus

Which is why most apps with sync have two sets of credentials: one to login on the platform and one master password for encryption. That helps in those scenarios.

fortran77

Yes. There are other ways of syncing (I have images of the setup QR codes save in an encrypted file) but most people wouldn’t be able to manage this.

layman51

You mean to say that if it were enabled on my Google account, then the TOTP numbers for my other accounts are visible via authenticating into Google Account on some other unknown device? Sounds like it could be convenient if you lose your phone, but still risky if an attacker can sign into your Google Account.

tetromino_

https://security.googleblog.com/2023/04/google-authenticator...

Google Authenticator can be local-only or synced to the cloud.

In local-only mode, the authenticator is bound to a specific device. You can manually sync it to additional devices, but if you lose access to all those devices, it's game over, you will get locked out of whatever accounts you secured with authenticator as the second factor.

In cloud-synced mode, it's synced to your google account, so if you lose your phone, you can restore authenticator state. But if your google account gets taken over, it's game over, the attacker has your authentication codes.