Supply Chain Attacks on Linux Distributions – Fedora Pagure

Wait, ssh doesn't let you specify the remote command without running it through the user's shell? That seems like a deficiency too IMHO.

This project looks amazing — I didn't think bootstrapping like this was possible. Kudos on the project :-).

This might displace chainguard as my goto docker images :-).

Pardon my naivete but I've heard Nix described in many of the same terms. What are the differences and similarities between Stageˣ and Nix/NixOS?

I think about this every time I install software. As a citizen of a small European nation, 100% of the software I use is under control of a foreign government, and I trust none of them. At least with open source software, there is a better chance of nefarious changes being detected by at least one of the parties building and packaging the software. With proprietary software, even that small level of assurance is not available.

There is a very big risk difference between a upstream package like XZ and running random application with brew or god forbid zsh auto update.

>Do Linux users think about this?

Yes that's why i avoid packages not in the official distro repositories and where possible further minimize risks by using additional security layer such as sandboxing (flatpak and firejail), mandatory access control (Apparmor or SELinux), virtualization (KVM/Qemu) and application firewalls (Opensnitch).

Think about it all the time. But, I find it overwhelming and shutdown.

I'll just enumerate my random thoughts

* If you're worried about nations, remember that they can, quite literally, send ninjas-in-attack-helicopters at you.

* Most nations already have "laws" that "require" you to provide passwords/data access on demand[4ab].

* If you use any "cloud", there's a high likelihood that they're already backdoored, either through legal means (i.e. through National Security Letters) or "not so legal, but who's going to stop them?" means such as just plain old hacking[1]

* All consumer CPUs already have builtin backdoors that can't really (but kind of, but who really know if it's effective) be disabled[2abc]

* Most printers print secret codes on printed documents that link back to the printer[3]

* I have no control over device firmware and some important drivers. I really don't know what my network card firmware is doing when I'm not using it and it has DMA to my system RAM. I "need" nvidia proprietary drivers to have a decent experience, no idea what they actually do.

* Nearly every piece of software includes some form of "Analytics" or "Telemetry", which often doesn't actually turn off when you click the stupid opt-out button.

[1] https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/10/30/241855353...

[2a] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine

[2b] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMD_Platform_Security_Processo...

[2c] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture_family#TrustZ...

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots

[4a] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law [4b] https://www.eff.org/wp/digital-privacy-us-border-2017

> I feel we are in a very innocent age and will look wistfully back at the days we trusted our anonymous open source brethren.

There seems to be some kind of inflection point of things:

* Enough users

* Enough time

* Enough cost

* Enough financial reward

Eventually, as those things culminate together, there is a loss of the shared value and...innocence(?) of any scene.

I think back to when RMS was aghast at the idea of MIT adding usernames and passwords to their machines in 1977. [1] It's a battle that I still feel bad that he lost against; a kind of presumption of universal access is a thing that I am intrinsically drawn to. It breaks my heart to think that any sort of restriction exists to technological access, in spite of the obvious need for computer security. Think about it - in the modern day, it's not only unthinkable, it's largely impossible to access most computers without some form of locked down authentication - even for publicly accessible computers at libraries! Most Operating System setups are designed with a fundamental assumption that you will be using both, regardless of whether it's a computer shared by 50 people in an office, or a personal laptop in your home, locked room that no other person will ever touch or see.

I sit here and I think about how there was a period where it was simply understood that, you treat computers and that network with a kind of prestige and respect. That you conduct yourself and the things you do in a manner that is good, because you have a desire for that thing to continue being used, accessible, and enjoyable by other people who have that same inner passion - that hunger! That, there did not need to be a threat of some kind of legal consequence - no laws even existed in regards to it. You did so...merely because you grasped that it was right, and you desired to do what was right. You did things right because you had a passion, a care, and a shared common interest among all of those other people to use those systems in a way that was good for all.

Sure, perhaps there were a few jokes and gags. A few fights or arguments over this or that. Plenty of "frivolous" things that could be done like play games and whatnot, but there was a kind of obvious social understanding that you did not do what is bad because it was bad. You wouldn't do bad things for the same reason why you wouldn't stop in the middle of a sidewalk and start using the bathroom in public - because its unacceptable to do so; it was inconsiderate to do so.

I feel like there is a flower of naivety that has wilted with time. It's not quite dead, but so many of its petals have dried up, fallen off, and crushed beneath the boot of financial incentive.

I imagine it to be similar to how the invention of the car must have felt. So much early optimism and obvious benefits. Only to be used to escape police. To transport booze and drugs. To steal from owners so it can be sold for parts. To kidnap children in. To hit pedestrians with. To use in wartime. It's a grim bleakness in life, that all things that can be cherished and enjoyed by the kindhearted, so horribly abused by the malcontent.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Stallman#Harvard_Unive...

Yeah, I tried that, but it doesn't work well with git-lfs (large file storage). At least, it didn't last time I tried.

Or just use git over https. And heck, if that's such a big problem, switch to a vcs that you can properly manage

The pathway of untrusted/malicious input -> trusted command line argument seems to be a common problem, and one that could possibly be mitigated by better type/taint checking.

It looks like there is some prior work in this area, but it hasn't resulted in commonly available implementations (even something basic like a type/taint checking version of exec() etc. on one side and getopt() etc. on the other.)

Sadly due to legacy.

—- disambiguates revisions and paths in some commands so another option was needed.

this could be a useful mechanism actually... shame it didn't work out