Skip to content(if available)orjump to list(if available)

Planes are having their GPS hacked. Could new clocks keep them safe?

kevin42

I have an amateur built experimental airplane, and on my first flight, GPS wasn't working. It was working on the ground, so I figured a bad coax cable or something from the vibration. When I landed it started working again, but later in the day it wasn't. A few days later I found out that the nearby Air Force base was testing GPS jamming, and there was even a NOTAM about it.

There's a site that tracks GPS jamming: https://gpsjam.org/

alexpotato

Wanted to highlight how GREAT the FAQ section is on that page. It feels like each question on that list is one that the author actually received and answered in an easy to understand format.

Makes me wish for the early days of the Internet where FAQ writing was good practice and writing a great FAQ was considered something worth celebrating.

jjwiseman

Thank you! I haven't updated that page in a long time, and there are a few things I should add. Some possibilities:

* Does this map show spoofing? No.

* How come sometimes I see aircraft flying over Ukraine? That's GPS spoofing.

* [Add Myanmar & Kashmir to the list of conflict zones.]

crote

I wish that website had some kind of timelapse functionality. It would be very useful to see how jamming in an area changes over time.

KennyBlanken

There are multiple sites that try to infer whether jamming is happening.

https://gpsjam.org/

https://spoofing.skai-data-services.com/

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/gps-jamming

Ukraine is of course a huge hotbed of jamming, but every time I've looked, there's been jamming on the US/Mexico border and a bit north of Texas around an airbase.

There's also a lot of info available here: https://www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/

jjwiseman

The apparent interference in Texas is almost always fighter pilots doing training. During aggressive maneuvering the aircraft fuselage can mask the GPS antenna, causing the aircraft to lose GPS accuracy.

jjwiseman

I'm thinking about adding that. (Donations help, see the About page.)

nradov

Is it common practice to go flying without checking for a NOTAM that might impact your intended route? (I'm not trying to insult you or anything, I'm not a pilot and don't know the standard procedures for dealing with those.)

jrockway

Should you brief the NOTAMs? Yes. Is it common to miss one? Also yes. Go look at the ATC YouTube channels and you will find lots of people being intercepted by fighter jets even though they use Foreflight.

Another problem is NOTAM spam; it seems like, in some areas, there are a bunch of NOTAMs that aren't very important but that you still have to read through to see if they're relevant. "We're testing GPS jamming" or "we will send a fighter jet if you fly into this rectangle" look a lot like the more common "taxiway T at Middle Of Nowhere Municipal Airport is out of service until 1/1/2038".

dmd

"One lamp out of 18 on this radio tower is operating at 75% brightness" repeated every day for years

jameslk

Could be a good opportunity for using an LLM to summarize and extract anything important?

buildsjets

NOTAMS are a bunch of garbage that no one pays any attention to. That’s not my opinion, that’s the opinion of former NTSB chairman Robert Sumwalt. I’m sure the GPS NOTAM was buried somewhere in the 27 page NOTAM list and it probably said something like this actual current GPS NOTAM: !GPS 03/022 GPS NAV PRN 08 U/S 2503061847-2506050001

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/20...

kevin42

I was flying in and out of a private airport in uncontrolled airspace, so I didn't check. If was my first test flight so I was pretty much just circling around my airstrip.

If I'm flying cross country, in to controlled airspace, or an airport I'm not familiar with, I will. But this particular notam didn't show up when I looked at nearby airports.

KoolKat23

This map is great,very interesting. curious that GPS is jammed over Gdansk, Helsinki and Tallinn.

jjwiseman

Russia has been jamming GPS over Finland, Estonia, and Poland on and off for a couple years, and it's been at its peak now for several months. Sometimes flights have to be canceled. Tartu airport in Estonia was closed for a while[1] because the only instrument approaches it has were GPS-based.

Even worse than jamming is spoofing, which Russia also does. With jamming, you and the aircraft's systems both know what's happening. Spoofing isn't as easy to detect, as the GPS system can report the wrong location but think it's highly accurate. Spoofing (and to some extent jamming) can have a persistent effect on aircraft systems even after they move out of range of the jammer/spoofer, which can lead to degraded navigation accuracy for the rest of the flight.

It's a whole deal. Russia is messing with strategically important systems of many European countries, and decreasing civilian aviation safety, and they rarely get called on it. For a long time there was reluctance to even name Russia as the culprit.

1. https://www.heise.de/en/news/GPS-jamming-no-more-flights-to-...

thaumasiotes

> Russia has been jamming GPS over Finland, Estonia, and Poland on and off for a couple years, and it's been at its peak now for several months. Sometimes flights have to be canceled.

I feel like we had airports before we had GPS. If this is a regular thing, shouldn't we have ways of using the airport without hoping that the jamming is having an off day?

ithkuil

They are surely doing that because they want to divert NATO expansion westward /s

lawrenceduk

It’s because they’re next to Kaliningrad, that weird Russian exclave

bitcurious

Another way to see that geography is as approaches into Russia. Gdansk borders Kaliningrad, Helsinki and Tallinn straddle St Petersburg.

alphan0n

I’ve never seen a map that has each locality in its primary language..

biker142541

It's the default OpensStreetMap style, which was never intended as a cartographic basemap for visualizations. Its purpose is to facilitate editing of the underlying data... but it's also one of the "free" options out there and integrated into most map library examples. ("free" because it's community-supported and heavy usage is discouraged, https://operations.osmfoundation.org/policies/tiles/)

jjwiseman

GPSJAM had a non-free map for years that didn't have this issue, but as the site got more traffic I could no longer afford to pay for it.

ge96

What is that area to the right of India?

inejge

Myanmar, alias Burma. They're having a hot civil war since 2021. (They've had tensions and insurgencies for as long as they've been an independent state.)

ajross

Myanmar. Unstable autocracy, recent coup, ongoing uprising. A huge mess, and exactly where you'd expect the ruling party to be trying to eliminate navigation aids.

pixl97

Myanmar, which is currently a conflict zone.

GJim

> to the right

*East

null

[deleted]

throw0101c

Another thing that is being looked at are antennas (CRPA: Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas) which filter signals more, so that "GPS signals" that come from the ground and the sides are more likely to be rejected:

* https://rntfnd.org/2025/02/26/faa-moving-toward-crpa-on-airc...

One tripping point is that in the US, CRPAs are on ITAR, so exports are difficult:

* https://www.gpsworld.com/first-fix-freeing-crpas/

Given that GPS/GNSS comes from satellites, ignoring signals from not-from-the-sky seems like a quick win.

burnerthrow008

> Given that GPS/GNSS comes from satellites, ignoring signals from not-from-the-sky seems like a quick win.

You're right, but GPS antennas already have some rejection from the "bottom" hemisphere. So they're already rejecting not-sky.

CRPAs (of the type contemplated by ITAR) are electronically steerable antennas (phased arrays), that allow you to steer one or more nulls to the direction of the noise source(s). That gives much better rejection of point-source noise.

jpm_sd

They're taking CRPAs off the ITAR list later this year, supposedly.

https://insidegnss.com/crpas-to-be-removed-from-itar-list-op...

KennyBlanken

GPS signals from low attitudes improve accuracy (to a point) because they provide much better triangulation. You want low attitude GPS satellites. You also don't want to lose signal every time the receiver tips, like when going up/down slight hills.

Aloisius

They don't lose signal when the receiver tips (which would make it useless for planes). They use antenna arrays to filter signals coming from directions they don't expect, too strong, etc.

These systems have been used used in military aircraft for a long time.

GJim

> triangulation

*Trilateration

One measures the time of flight of the satellites signal, not the angle it arrives from!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateration

Scoundreller

Also, the Doppler shift of jamming/spoofing will be all wrong, unless they’re specifically targeting your vehicle and accounting for its speed and direction in their attack.

… if you can get the precision to filter that out…

reflexe

The article is a bit strange. While GPS can be used to receive accurate timing (phase correction once per second), for gps less navigation, even a picosecond accurate atomic clock wont really give any additional benefit compared to a wirst watch.

Using an accurate clock, you might be able to detect spoofing (by detecting small “jumps in time”). However, the same should be possible even with a non accurate clock (a few ppms) by detecting conflicts between the different satellites timings (since the “fake” transmitter is on earth, it will never be able to accurately simulate the real satellites’ airtime delays from space to your specific reception location).

On the other hand, if you pair a very accurate clock with a very accurate gyroscope, you might be able to replace gps altogether (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_navigation_system) But from my knowledge, these kind of gyros are not really available for sale (but this is already outside of my knowledge, so maybe something changed).

Aurornis

> On the other hand, if you pair a very accurate clock with a very accurate gyroscope, you might be able to replace gps altogether (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_navigation_system) But from my knowledge, these kind of gyros are not really available for sale (but this is already outside of my knowledge, so maybe something changed).

Dead reckoning systems are available with varying degrees of accuracy and drift depending on your budget. It's common to use them to guess location during GPS dropouts, such as driving through tunnels.

More accurate systems are available as budget allows and the military has a lot of research on this topic. Error accumulates over time, so the longer you go without a GPS reset, the worse the precision gets.

You can't fully eliminate the error accumulation over time, so they can't completely replace GPS. You still need some way to periodically refresh your ground truth position.

null

[deleted]

DannyBee

yeah, i don't get it either.

The clock is not the hard part of this. Oscillators doing 10mhz or 1pps with nanosecond accurate holdover for 24hours are easily available (for like 3k for chip-scale atomic clocks, and less for rubidium or whatever ).

Galileo et al also have publicly available cryptographic signatures so you can't actually spoof them, only jam them.

If you are trying to do navigation while jammed, the reckoning is the hard part of this, not the clock.

We solved the clock enough already.

Aloisius

> Galileo et al also have publicly available cryptographic signatures so you can't actually spoof them, only jam them.

Replay attacks still work allowing one to spoof location.

DannyBee

The first thing i said makes this sort of irrelevant, but to go down this path:

The replay attacks i'm aware of fall into two categories - cold start and warm start (mostly from https://arxiv.org/html/2501.09246v1, which has been in progress for a while)

The cold start replay attacks are irrelevant here - unless you can force-restart the gps receiver in cold start mode during flight. If you can do that, you probably don't need to spoof the signal. Especially since it requires precise timing to forge the new signal to the receiver at the right time (otherwise it detects it), etc. Seems like there are easier ways.

The warm start replay attack A. Requires you replay valid, but out of date, signals, in real time. This is non-trivial, and also limited in effect as you can only arbitrarily spoof one receiver to a location of your choosing - maybe you can get a few receivers with really good high-signal strength directional beaming of different replays, but it requires real-time tracking and adjustment of the signal of the target anyway to be able to spoof the location accurately.

Spoofing the location inaccurately is sort of pointless in most cases.

B. The attack has to change the time (and thus location) slow enough to not trigger various protections, then keep changing it slowly enough to continue that.

C. The attack requires that your receiver is too stupid to notice that a forced revert to non-authenticated time occurred, doesn't notify you of this, and then doesn't notice that time or location jumped suddenly by more than any reasonable amount. It also has to not notice that the SNR of everything suddenly changed, etc. Oh, also, they have to spoof all other sources of time, including local oscillators, etc, for you to not notice.

Given we just talked about how cheap and easy it is to have a high quality oscillator disciplined to time before takeoff, this kind of replay attack seems "practical" only in the sense that it is possible.

Are you aware of other replay attacks, if so, that'd be cool :)

Otherwise, yes, I agree you can spoof location in theory. I can't imagine a practical application of it in the scenario we are talking about.

shannonclaude

Magnetic-anomaly based navigation (MagNav) is a real thing that can solve this problem, and has been shown to work with the accuracy of a few hundred meters. Perhaps the government and defense contractors should look into this technology more. With a few more years of funded R&D and FAA-certification, I think its pretty likely that we'll see some of these systems on planes soon. The military is already flying with it during their exercises.

disclosure - I do work on a team developing MagNav, but much of the seminal research has come out of the Air Force Institution of Technology. They performed it on an F16, paper results shown here https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9506809

vlovich123

It’s not uncommon to fuse magnetometer with other sensors. We did that for indoor navigation at Apple. In fact, we had prototypes that used only magnetometer and it worked fairly well for what it was but the low update rate and poor resolution meant that it worked to like 10-30 meters which wasn’t usable for indoor by itself. Of course, for indoor there was a lot more “texture” indoors for the commercial magnetometer of the time to pick up whereas outdoor it gets trickier. Is that similar to how MagNav works just with higher quality more sensitive magnetometers?

shannonclaude

So the role that magnetometers play in sensor fusion w/ IMU data is for yaw/heading/magnetic north estimation. In short, it aids your orientation (RPY estimate). However, with MagNav, they play a large role in supplying information that allows you to decrease your drift rate.

https://www.sagemotion.com/blog/how-does-imu-sensor-fusion-w...

vlovich123

Yes, we were doing all of that at Apple over ten years ago. I was specifically pointing out that just like WiFi has “texture” that lets you machine learn a position, so does the mag field, letting you determine an absolute position estimate purely from the magnetometer. I was wondering if the sensors and algorithms have advanced on that front.

mrandish

I find these sorts of alternatives to what I'll call 'adversarially contested technologies' super interesting. Jamming drone control and video links is another similar instance where alternatives like MagNav could prove useful by allowing autonomous fallback operation in the case of signal loss. I assume viable solutions will probably require a fusion of approaches like MagNav, optical terrain following, laser altimeter, etc

shannonclaude

We're working on making MagNav a one stop shop backup for GPS. I think to cover ALL cases however, you'll need other technologies. TERCOM, visual, and celestial all have their niche use cases.

But for most cases, MagNav should do the job. Happy to answer more

mrandish

Well, since you were kind enough to offer...

1. Roughly how long does it take for MagNav to get a "lock". For example, GPS takes 10 or 15 seconds (at least consumer stuff I have access to). Also, with GPS the accuracy improves if you're moving. I assume it may be similar with MagNav but it would be an interesting advantage if MagNav got a lock super fast vs GPS and/or it was basically at 100% resolution without needing to move (and I understand MagNav's "100%" res is much lower than GPS).

2. What's your drive-by guesstimate on probable future evolution of MagNav tech on the 'Four Horsemen' of mobile tech (size, weight, power, cost)? For example, which of the four are more like "No reason it can't improve a lot if given sufficient time, funding and development with no new science required" and are more "Well, physics/materials are currently an unsolved, seemingly fundamental barrier to improving beyond X threshold." In a perfect world... (the one we don't live in), MagNav would be on a five year productization track that'll put it inside an Micro SD card footprint with negligible power budget at 25 cents/ea by the million and be common in small Costco drones as a fallback if GPS fails.

Also, nicely appropriate username :-)

null

[deleted]

stefan_

If you had to break it down to the essential parts, how much would it weigh? Do you rely on having measured the area you are flying in previously?

shannonclaude

Currently 20-40 pounds right now, but we're working to reduce the SWaP. MagNav does rely on having accurate magnetic anomaly maps, which the government and certain private companies have access to.

skywal_l

Are those anomalies change over time? Do you have to continuously update those devices with the latest maps?

mmooss

> Air Force Institution of Technology

I've never heard of that - what is it? What's it like to work with them (if you did)?

shannonclaude

It's the Air Force's higher ed institution. They offer masters and PhDs. They have their own labs doing R&D.

bArray

> The Boeing 737 MAX 8-200 had already descended to around 850ft (259m) when the disruption occurred. Instead of landing, the plane was forced to climb back into the sky and divert nearly 400km (250 miles) south to Warsaw, Poland. Lithuanian air authorities later confirmed the aircraft had been affected by "GPS signal interference".

GPS is incredibly flimsy. Normally it operates by taking the average of 1000 observations to generate a noisy signal. It's not that difficult to be louder than something shouting from space. You can pick up cheap GPS blockers easily about the size of a walkie-talkie (handheld radio).

> By carrying a group of atoms cooled to -273C on the plane itself, rather than relying on an external signal, the technology can't be interfered with by jamming.

Last year I was on a plane where if the engines were not running, it entirely went into darkness. They hooked the plane up to the airport and tripped the airport electrics too. Now imagine if your plane loses power momentarily, and suddenly your GPS stops working entirely.

> Henry White, part of the team from BAE Systems that worked on the test flight, told BBC News that he thought the first application could be aboard ships, "where there's a bit more space".

> Quantum clocks, gyroscopes and accelerometers are large, bulky and incredibly expensive, with an accurate quantum clock costing around £100,000. Yet military research is allowing the creation of smaller, better and cheaper systems.

Likely a minimum of 10 years from being viable. Mt White of BAE is politely saying as much.

mapt

Chip-scale atomic clocks based on cesium were demonstrated in 2003 with DARPA/NIST funding, and entered commercial production in 2011.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip-scale_atomic_clock

Apparently they're not even export-protected, despite their obvious use in GPS validation schemes and in RTK.

> The SA.45s CSAC has an Export Commodity Control Number (ECCN) of EAR99. This means it is not ITAR-controlled and does not require a special license to ship to most nations. The SA.45s CSAC classification is controlled by the Bureau of Industrial Security (BIS) within the US Department of Commerce.

The article talks about quantum "optical clocks" but doesn't really explain the concept.

Which appears to be this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic_clock

Which, like many things named "Quantum", still doesn't really explain how you get an IMU out of it.

fanf2

The article is deeply confused.

It’s true that optical clocks will improve the accuracy of our measurement of time, and it’s true that GPS depends on time, but there are several steps between primary frequency standards (ie, optical clocks) and GPS, and several more steps between GPS and navigation applications.

So optical clocks cannot, in fact, have any effect on the end-user perceived reliability of GPS.

For that, the best solution is to revive LORAN which is much less susceptible to jamming. (And would also benefit from better atomic clocks.)

mapt

Much of Finland and Estonia are currently being jammed per https://gpsjam.org/?lat=58.53948&lon=24.82400&z=4.9&date=202...

Finland is reintroducing DME: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/three-fin...

Which seems to be a different concept from LORAN, but still useful for navigation when multiple base stations are in range.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distance_measuring_equipment

pclmulqdq

You can do about 5x worse (in accuracy terms) than a Cesium clock in a smaller package using a rubidium atomic clock. Average ~4 of these and you get to the same accuracy as a cesium clock. They aren't export controlled because they aren't that special in terms of what you get.

mapt

To improve instrumental accuracy by 5x in a single dimension when fighting against random uncorrelated drift/noise, from what I recall of statistics you require 5^2 = 25x as many instruments.

Havoc

They’re probably talking about this for quantum navigation

https://www.theguardian.com/science/article/2024/jun/15/lond...

pclmulqdq

The diamond-based quantum IMUs are a completely different appliance and a different application (dead reckoning).

freddie_mercury

> Now imagine if your plane loses power momentarily, and suddenly your GPS stops working entirely.

Now imagine your plane loses power momentarily and switches to a backup system... The exact same GPS every plane is using today.

SkyPuncher

Even further, you can loose your super accurate special crystal and simply fall back to “normal” GPS.

Cthulhu_

I don't really understand why the plane was diverted because GPS was jammed; I get that it's important for navigation, but not how it's required for landing when they're that close. There's (iirc) close range guidance systems, and of course visual ones (lamps, stripes, etc).

rlpb

Not all types of approaches are available at all runways (or airports), and sometimes they are down for maintenance. Specific runways may be required due to wind, aircraft weight and runway condition and length. Most airlines ban "circling approaches" (using an approach to one runway end and then circling visually to land at a other) for safety reasons. ILS, which is probably the "close range guidance" you are thinking of, must be installed, maintained and calibrated individually per runway end. Visual aids cannot be used for approach if there is low cloud.

It is usual to be able to abort an approach and try again at the same airport using a different approach technology. But if the journalist wanted to find the most extreme example, it's not surprising that it happened at least once that an alternative wasn't available. This is probably "sampling bias"!

Note that final operational decisions are made by the aircraft commander. Aircraft do not "get diverted", except by decision of the "captain".

macguillicuddy

My understanding is it depends on the amount of visibility, plus what type of approach they were on. One type of approach, an ILS, has big radio transmitters pointing from the runway into the air and allows the plane (either pilots or autopilot) to get close enough to the runway without visibility, and with enough precision, to land. In many circumstances ILS isn't available and an alternative is Required Navigation Performance (RNP) which uses GPS plus a ton of other inputs to give some amount of precision to the same end. If they're on an RNP approach but suffer a reduction in navigation accuracy then I imagine it's a policy 'go-around'. Even if there's enough visibility it allows the pilots to brief a 'visual' approach before attempting it.

Gathering6678

Considering it's below 1000 feet, losing GPS could indicate an "unstablized" approach and require a go-around, as opposed to losing it at a higher altitude where the pilot could have more time to safely switch to alternatives (other navigating aids or go to visual?).

Source: my guess after watching a lot of aviation YouTube videos......

alistairSH

For anybody who doesn't know, a "stabilized approach" is an approach with a constant angle and speed as the plane descends and lands. This allows the plane to keep consistent control settings (flaps, throttle, etc).

It's best practice/policy for all major airlines to use stabilized approaches and most/all require a go-around if the stabilized approach is interrupted (there are edge cases and exceptions).

mapt

Commercial air travel is very risk-averse. Best practice is that if something unexpected occurs, and you have plenty of fuel to spare, you go and and find someplace else to land.

gbil

Personally, I find it comforting that the plane was able to fly 400km more!

biker142541

Hacked doesn't seem like the right term. It's jamming, being overwhelmed, not infiltrated in any way. Curious if others use this term in such a way?

asynchronousx

The vast majority of people don’t know that GPS is only a one-way transaction anyways. They think most devices talk back to the satellites somehow.

diggan

> They think most devices talk back to the satellites somehow.

To be honest, I don't think most people realize GPS is coming from satellites in the first place. Most people simply don't think about how/why at all when using things.

anticensor

GPS and almost all other GNSS is indeed downlink-only. However, Starlink and other LEO internet providers could offer a two-way GNSS service if they added precision clocks in their satellites.

jotux

The term used in industry is typically "spoofing."

https://www.u-blox.com/en/blogs/tech/gnss-spoofing-new-secur...

vlovich123

Spoofing is different from jamming. Spoofing is when you trick the receiver into thinking the position is one you fed it vs jamming is you preventing it from acquiring a signal at all. Jamming is much easier while spoofing can be more difficult if there’s encryption on the signal. Unfortunately I think commercial signals aren’t signed with a private key to completely prevent spoofing but I’m not 100% sure.

logifail

> Hacked doesn't seem like the right term

... and this term only appears in the headline, not (anywhere!) in the body text. Wonder if the author of the article intended that term to be used, or whether the (sub)editors put it in to help get more clicks?

biker142541

lol, good point. I wouldn't doubt this as a cause.

Animats

Detailed summary from Ops.group, which is for pilots and flight planners.[1] It's really bad. They write:

Typical indications of Spoofing

Unlike jamming, a GPS signal is present, but it has fake information. False GPS position, time, and date information will be processed by the GPS receiver as being valid. As soon as this is fed to other systems, failure messages will begin.

• Rapid EPU or ANP increase

• GPS position and IRS or FMS position disagree caution message

• Aircraft Clock time changes, or difference between Capt/FO clocks

• Transponder failure: EICAS/ECAM “ATC FAIL”

• Autopilot turns aircraft unexpectedly

• ADS-B Failure/Warning

• Synthetic Vision reverting to blue over brown

• Loss of enhanced display, such as display of terrain on PDI

• Wind indication on ND is illogical or has a major shift - erratic groundspeed

• GPS position symbol on ND drifts away from the FMS and the IRS symbols

• Datalink (CPDLC, ADS-C) failure warning

• GPS information on sensor page shows unusual values: altitude, etc.

• Handheld GPS (e.g. Garmin, iPad) disagrees with aircraft GPS position

• EGPWS audible warning (‘Pull Up”)

• GPS 1 and 2 dramatically different i.e. more than 100 meters, which may also give an ECAM/EICAS GPS miscompare warning.

• Spoofing Alerting app e.g. Naviguard gives alert

• ACARS message from ground/ops advises of spoofing (based on aircraft downlink message with unusual values)

[1] https://ops.group/blog/crew-guidance-published-by-gps-spoofi...

_heimdall

When Israel was waiting for a retaliatory strike from Iran they jammed GPS in the region. I never found a clear explanation of how it was done technically, this would make total sense if their system also was targeting atomic clock signals rather than GPS itself to confuse incoming missiles or aircraft.

That does raise an interesting question though - do missles actually depend on the standard atomic clock signals? Maybe that isn't how they did it, that seems like a dependency you wouldn't want in a weapon.

fsh

GPS signals are atomic clock signals. The receiver triangulates its position by comparing the time delays between the signals originating from different satellites. The receiver itself doesn't require a good clock since it only compares signals with each other.

grotorea

And you can even update your clock info from the GPS signal. So the only dependency is GPS or similar.

But would Iranian missiles even use GPS? Isn't accuracy limited for civilian use for precisely this reason?

avianlyric

No. The US stopped degrading civilian GPS accuracy in 2001[1]. Although the US retains the ability to degrade civilian GPS in specific target areas.

Regardless, if you’re building a long range missile, you need some ability for it to navigate. If you’re not using GPS, then what would you use instead? Additionally there’s nothing preventing you from using multiple navigation systems in tandem and fusing the results together, which is almost certainly what these missile do.

Sensor fusion reduces the impact of stuff like GPS jamming, but certainly doesn’t eliminate it. The over all system will be less accurate with fewer inputs, and if you’re the one faced with a high speed missile flying at you, I suspect you’ll take every edge you can get, regardless of how small the impact might be.

[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Error_analysis_for_the_Globa...

baskinator

A error correction technique I learned as a young land surveying assistant is to put a gps antenna on a known fixed point location. The delta between the fixed point and the point of measurement is cancelled out to get a more accurate read.

We did this to trial some new (at the time) surveying equipment when the primary equipment was optical. It would save time for really long measurements through the forest and mountainous terrain .

dghlsakjg

GPS Accuracy used to be limited, but that ended decades ago.

There are rules about GPS hardware that say that they should cease working above certain speeds and altitudes for guided missile purposes. But that is a firmware issue. I’m sure the Iranians have figured that out if the are even using off the shelf hardware.

hylaride

GPS signals are relatively low power (American GPS broadcasts at 25 watts and the signal is a tiny fraction of a mW at sea level). In theory, it's easy to pump out noise over it, especially the civilian frequencies that Iran would in theory be using.

Depending on the receivers and what (combination?) of GPS/GLONASS/GALILEO/BAIDU Iran uses, you could easily overwhelm them.

There have been cases of delivery drivers using jammers to stop companies from tracking them, only to interfere with airport landing systems, which is a concern as a lot of warehouses are near airports.

EDIT: power at ground level is miniscule

pbmonster

> GPS signals are relatively low power (American GPS broadcasts at 25 watts and are ~10-15W at sea level)

Did you lose 16 orders of magnitude for the sea level values? GPS signal strength on the ground is usually below -135dBm per square meter. That gives you a couple of femtowatts with commonly used antenna, if you're lucky.

Easy to jam doesn't begin to describe it.

hylaride

Shit, you're right. I blame the time change.

SJC_Hacker

My understanding is you just flood the spectrum at the frequency that GPS is operating at

GPS signals are weak since they come from far away

hylaride

GPS (as well as most satellite) signals are weak because it's strong enough for line of sight even from so far away. They only transmit at 25W. Comparatively, an FM/TV signal will often broadcast at tens of thousands of watts and up.

csense

If you can't receive signals from the GPS satellites because some country's military is jamming them, how does having an accurate on-board clock help?

Are they somehow able to determine position via dead reckoning? How does that account for errors from wind, vibration, etc. and compounding of errors over time? (I'm pretty sure dead reckoning is not a closed-loop system)

"Miniaturize a very accurate clock" seems like a fairly straightforward engineering challenge. "I can give you clocks as precise as you need, now design me a system that can give your coordinates in thick fog without GPS or any other external radio signals" seems like a much harder one.

SJC_Hacker

Historically ships at sea could determine latitude through sun-sighting or stars, but longitude was impossible because they did not have a clock which was accurate enough

I doubt they're navigating using the sun an stars, but if the airspeed indicator is accurate, and you know you're heading, all you need is an accurate clock to determine absolute position since the last known good position.

turnvilis

> if the airspeed indicator is accurate, and you know you're heading, all you need is an accurate clock to determine absolute position

Airspeed gives speed relative to the air, not the ground. To compute ground speed, you also need winds aloft, which can be huge if the aircraft is operating in the jet stream.

Getting good data for winds aloft is difficult because there are a relatively small number of actual measurements, and everything else is model output with all the usual caveats.

Dylan16807

But quartz is accurate enough for that, let alone a properly calibrated oscillator. So why is the article focused on giving planes atomic clocks?

cpncrunch

Indeed. The article is a bit confusing on details. At the end it talks about accelerometers and gyros, but aircraft have been using laser ring gyros for decades. They now use gps because it is much more accurate.

Salgat

The article does a poor job explaining, but seems to imply that they are working on replacing GPS altogether with a local system that relies on an atomic clock and quantum engineering. From what I can find, there are many approaches to this, including quantum gravimetry, quantum accelerometers, etc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_sensor

brohee

It's not white noise jamming it's replaying with a delay, so the receiver is getting a meaningful signal.

Salgat

Technically both techniques can be used for gps hacking. It also seems you can fake a gps signal altogether, because the public signal is not cryptographically signed, which surprises me (the only thing that makes sense to me is that the gps protocol doesn't have room for adding a signature, so it'd be a breaking change to the protocol).

thesh4d0w

I don't understand this article. If the GPS signals are jammed, what purpose does it serve to have an atomic clock on board your plane? You still need accurate signals with time data to measure against.

Am I missing something?

touisteur

You can get a very accurate timestamp from GNSS. What lots of people do then is slave a PLL based on a local oscillator, to be able to get time between two GNSS captations. Or to be able to extrapolate when they have no GNSS signal.

Now suppose someone is spoofing your GNSS signals, it's pretty hard to replace a constellation with another one whilst maintaining time consistency for you. One way to detect spoofing is comparing what a local clock is saying to whatever the GNSS is giving. A local, unfudgeable, stable, accurate clock is a good reference for this.

DannyBee

The article is seriously confused. What you are talking about is easy - chip scale atomic clocks are easy to get. I can have one shipped to me today. Hell, i have one on a time card in my basement.

Assume you want it even super accurate.

Great, 3k for an SA65 https://www.microchip.com/en-us/products/clock-and-timing/co...

Holdover would be fine for even a very long flight.

Hell, even a good rubidium oscillator doing 1PPS will stay within 200 nanoseconds over 12 hours.

If you are trying to do navigation while jammed, none of these help you.

You still need good reckoning, which is the hard part

We done solved the clock problem enough already :)

touisteur

I was under the impression (and from experience too) that the very stable oscillators were finicky and sensitive to temperature swings and in general costly to use properly in "hard" environments.

I'm happy to learn this is not the case for every good oscillator. TIL.

thesh4d0w

Ahhhhh, that makes sense. Treating this as security mechanism rather than an anti-jamming one.

simne

As I read from book about gyroscopes, most sensitive achieve so fine accuracy, they detect daily Earth rotation and even yearly Earth rotation.

But when they speaking about near zero temperatures, looks like they talking about something like Rydberg atoms - extremely sensitive matter, which could be considered as nuclear scale gyroscopes, or quantum gyroscopes, or read more about quantum accelerometer.

And current inertial navigation could be used to calculate relative coordinates like automobile odometer, but from integrating accelerations. But classic accelerometer is just not fine enough, and at this place appear quantum accelerometer and quantum gyroscope.

And I agree, article is terrible. I don't know why they use so abstract language, when could just say, navy already tested quantum navigation.

simne

To be more concrete, space rockets nearly all fly with inertial navigation, but they are extreme case, because most use only inertial navigation just few minutes (so all those classic gyros/accelerometers integrated errors are small enough to successful enter stable orbit, and then using some sort of radio or optical fine measurements and making corrections with fine engines).

Planes flights are much more lengthy than rockets - I think, typical ~40 minutes or more (most long I hear 20 hours), so INS could integrate huge mistake.

foldr

I believe submarines navigate long distances using INS. I don’t know how accurate it is, or how often they have to make corrections using other data. But ballistic missile submarines can’t really use active sonar or surface with any frequency, so I’m not sure what other method they’d use.

p_l

INS essentially was expensive and AFAIK once GPS became available started to drop off in use outside of military. And with GPS availability coinciding with switching to more modern integrated Flight Management System/Computer, a lot of planes simply don't have INS installed.

magnetometer

> most sensitive achieve so fine accuracy, they detect daily Earth rotation and even yearly Earth rotation

Daily rotation is 360°/23.934h, so 0,25°/min, which is acutally quite a lot if you want to use a device to track your orientation.

simne

Unfortunately, these numbers considered state of art for modern classic gyroscopes.

Better are quantum navigation systems, using quantum matter as sensor, but they was too bulky to be used on planes, only last years appear more compact systems, sized like common home fridge.

RandomBacon

> daily Earth rotation and even yearly Earth rotation.

Minor FYI: the earth rotates daily, but it revolves around the sun yearly.

    revolve /rĭ-vŏlv′/
    intransitive verb
    To orbit a central point.
    "The planets revolve around the sun."

HPsquared

I took it to mean "able to measure a rotation rate of 1 turn per year".

lupusreal

> they detect daily Earth rotation

This is the principle gyrocompasses work on; when left running for a while they align themselves with true north; the axis of Earths rotation.

BenjiWiebe

I didn't read the article, but: a GPS receiver must calculate/find both it's time and position to get a fix. So maybe by having the time already available really accurately it makes the job of finding position easier?

gorbypark

From my (very basic) understanding of GPS you need at minimum four satellites to calculate the time. If you had a local atomic clock in sync with the GPS satellites, you'd only need three satellites to get a position fix. It would (probably, maybe?) also speed up the time to first fix / time to a precise position fix.

mvip

Shameless self-plug: I had Ken Munro from PTP on my podcast [1] in the episode 'Hacking airplanes, ships and IoT devices with Ken Munro' where we dove into GPS hacking and spoofing at length.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rkhCN7taMK4

KaiserPro

GPS and other navigation systems are well worth the time to look into.

something like Decca or LORAN are really simple to understand: two or more base stations in a known location emitting phase locked signals. By counting the nodes/antinodes of the harmonics, you can work out how far away you are from the base stations. The downside is that you need a initial fix to work out absolute location.

The thing thats kinda touched on here is that GPS uses clocks to allow the receiver to work out how long the signal has been in flight (simplification) If you know where the satellites are (using the Almanac of satellite positions) you can get your location by fairly simple triangulation.

Now, you don't have an atomic clock on your receiver, so how can you accurately measure the time difference between signals?

for GPS you only need to know the relative time difference between each satellite, and even thought quartz clocks are only accurate to seconds a year, in the ~20-50ms it takes for the signal to arrive, its more than accurate enough.

However that means you are open to spoofing, because you sync your local clock to a satellite, you have no real way of detecting if the clock has skipped.

If you have an accurate clock source, you can then validate the clocks that are on the transmitters. I think, but can't confidently assert that calculating position becomes easier because you have an authoritative clock source, so don't need to piss about with clock sync using an unknown time offset.

I think the implication is that this provides a strong form of signal authentication.

However chipscale super-stable clock references also allow more autonomous styles of navigation. (ie celestial)