Bypass DeepSeek censorship by speaking in hex
substack.com
Show HN: Perforator – cluster-wide profiling tool for large data centers
github.com
Earthstar – A database for private, distributed, offline-first applications
earthstar-project.org
Hoppscotch: Open source alternative to Postman / Insomnia
github.com
Elite on the 6502: The original 6502 assembly source, heavily commented
elite.bbcelite.com
Sparrow, a modern C++ implementation of the Apache Arrow columnar format
johan-mabille.medium.com
List of 200 UK companies that moved to 4-day working week
future4days.com
Why Tracebit is written in C#
tracebit.com
FBI, Dutch police disrupt 'Manipulaters' phishing gang
krebsonsecurity.com
The Tensor Cookbook (2024)
tensorcookbook.com
Auto-Differentiating Any LLM Workflow: A Farewell to Manual Prompting
arxiv.org
AI and two hundred dollar tasks
blog.ninlabs.com
The Severance writer and cast on corporate cults, sci-fi, and more
arstechnica.com
Scientists find links between Alzheimer's, herpes, and head trauma
statnews.com
Show HN: Uscope, a new Linux debugger written from scratch
github.com
Zusie – My Relay Computer
nablaman.com
Hell is overconfident developers writing encryption code
soatok.blog
Fixing E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial for the Atari 2600 (2013)
neocomputer.org
Living with Nausea: My Story in Six Charts
c82.net
Hm. I realise this is an advertisement but that just makes its deficient treatment of failure all the more worrying.
I have yet to write the article on systems-theoretic accident analysis that is long overdue, but I don't subscribe to the idea that there is "a" root cause, much less "the" root cause. What people call a root cause is almost always just an arbitrary stopping point for analysis. This stopping point is selected either based on convenience or for political reasons.
Any real-world accident comes after running the system in a hazardous state, often for quite some time. The decision to do this is rarely explicit or the result of one thing, but a multitude of interacting factors and competing interests. A safe system needs feedback loops and control actions to keep it out of hazardous states. For any accident, we will usually find many missing or deficient control systems and feedback paths.
This is usually easier to phrase in reverse: we would never ask someone to identify the root cause of success -- and it's just as silly to do it in the case of failure.