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Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems

Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems

87 comments

·December 17, 2025

dfabulich

The author still has one last misconception about passkeys, namely that if you lose a passkey, you have "no recourse."

People wrongly think passkeys are like Bitcoin wallets, where losing them means there's absolutely nothing you can do, your account is simply lost forever.

Losing a passkey is exactly like losing your password, which is to say, that for 99% of services, you can reset your password/passkey really easily. There's a prominent "Reset Password" button right on the login form. It sends you an email or an SMS, you click it, and it lets you reset right then and there. You can reset your passkey in exactly the same way.

It is not that easy to reset if you lose your password to your Apple, Google, Facebook, etc. They all have a bunch of factors that they use to authenticate you if you reset your password, and they don't even document which ones they use.

So, if you care about those accounts, you've got to make sure you have backup access. They all let you generate and print "backup codes" (emergency passwords) and store them in a fireproof safe or a literal bank vault. Do that!

As everybody knows, you can't store all of your passwords in a password manager. You need something outside of the password manager to login to the manager itself. That's why 1Password/LastPass is called that; you still need one last password that you keep and manage yourself.

That's true of passkeys, too. You can login to Google with passkey, but if Google is your password manager that stores your passkey, you need something else outside of Google's password manager to login to Google. Whether it's a password, a backup code, a YubiKey, whatever, you need one more thing to login to Google, ideally more than one, so you can back it up and keep it safe.

novok

Pre-passkeys, was this lockout issue a true issue with apple and google accounts? Or have passkeys added a general lockout issue that didn't exist before? Also passkeys in their current implementation are not possible to back up or export yourself, unlike passwords in the past.

Security engineers are prioritizing preventing key copying over lockout issues, unilaterally, on literally billions of people. It improves their metrics internally, at the cost of an externality on the entire world. This kind of stuff invites odious regulation as more and more stories of lockout with no recourse surface.

And unlike passwords, there is no good provider migration story. There is a roach motel issue. Yes it is being 'worked on', but passkeys and such have been out for many years, the willful denial whenever you ask people running these standards about these issues is incredibly irritating. The fact they tend to avoid questions about this like politicians decreases trust in the motives of such standards.

dfabulich

No, passkeys haven't added a new general lockout issue, because Apple, Google, etc. don't allow you to create an account where you can only login via passkey with no external authentication factor. They require you have something outside the Google account, whether that's a password, a hardware key, etc.

People keep falsely imagining that Google is setting people up with passkey-only accounts, with no way to backup their login credentials. Gosh, wouldn't that be terrible?

That would be like 1Password letting you create a passkey-only account with no password, storing the only passkey in 1Password. The whole idea makes no sense. 1Password doesn't do that, and neither does Apple, Google, Microsoft, etc. (We can all imagine them doing something that stupid, but, it turns out, they don't.)

Pre-passkeys, the most common lost-credential scenario was creating a fresh Gmail address on a new device (an Android phone) with a password and forgetting both your Google password and your password for your cellular-phone carrier (AT&T, T-Mobile, etc). Your Google password would be stored locally on your phone and in Google's cloud, but when you lose your phone and forget your passwords, no backups remain.

At that point, you're pretty much screwed. Google can't email you a reset-password link, because Gmail is your email. Google can't you send a 2FA SMS until you get a new phone with the same number, but you can't convince AT&T to do that, because they want to send a reset-password link to your email, which you don't have, or SMS to your phone, which you don't have.

(The cellular carriers don't even allow you to show government ID at a physical store. They don't allow you to take over a phone number that way, because people could then threaten/bribe a T-Mobile store representative to falsely claim that you presented valid government ID, taking over other people's accounts. If you walk into a store, they'll just put you on the phone with customer service, where they'll insist that you provide your AT&T password, or reset your password via email or SMS. If you've lost your email and your phone and all your passwords, you're completely out of luck.)

If Google allowed you to create a passkey-only account, with no SMS 2FA and no way to backup your passkey, that would be even worse.

But, luckily for all of us, they don't even allow that, and they're certainly not pushing it unilaterally on billions of people.

lucideer

> unlike passwords, there is no good provider migration story

I'm curious what the "good provider migration story" you're referring to here for passwords is?

Password managers by-and-large haven't agreed on a standardised interchange format for import/export - a few of them have some compatibility helpers for importing from specific popular competitors but they're all in different formats, no consistent formats.

The above goes for passkeys as it does passwords - import/export will include your passkeys - so I don't see much difference in the provider migration story.

On the other hand, the FIDO Credential Exchange Format does solve the above problem (if/when providers choose to adopt it), so passkeys are at least further along the path of creating a "good provider migration story" than passwords ever were.

joshuamorton

Yes. People have complained about the difficulty of Google or Facebook account recovery and how they need to make it easier and more accurate for ages. You could search hn for "password reset" or "lost password" and you'll find tons.

whartung

Also, just so I'm clear, there's no requirement to share passkeys. Or even have passkeys enabled on all devices, right?

If I log in to a site from my machine, and set up a passkey, but then log into that site from another machine, it'll just see no passkey present and ask for my password, yes?

A passkey is a local password on a device that could be shared through all the password manager gymnastics, but its not required as I understand it.

corranh

Apple and Google often store your other 99% of passwords and passkeys, so losing this is actually more important than losing the 99%. I take your point but saying 99% have reset services when the critical 1% may never be recoverable without posting to HN is an important point.

Asooka

For those you add recovery e-mails. You can easily have a Google, Microsoft and Yahoo e-mail so having access to at least one means you can recover the rest. Yes, this increases your attack surface, but the chances remain miniscule.

kemotep

2 things about passkeys I wish would be fixed.

1. Passkey prompts asking if I want to use a phone or security key when I only have one (or neither!) registered. The UI for this gets in the way and should only ever present itself if I happen to have both kinds of devices registered.

2. Passkeys should have had the portability and flexibility that ssh keys have from the start. Making it so your grandparents can use public key cryptography and gain a significant advantage in securing their accounts in a user friendly manner should have been the priority. Seems like vendor lock-in was the goal from the start.

n8cpdx

On Mac with the security key you can just press the button on the security key before choosing a path. It only looks like a required extra step but in practice it is optional.

nine_k

Passkeys seem to be the best solution for users whose technical chops cannot be trusted, and who are also gullible enough to be a scam / social engineering target. Which, to my mind, describes a large enough chunk of audience of most popular services.

A tech-savvy relative of such a user should help them generate rescue codes, write them on a piece of paper, and store them along with all other important documents. Ideally the paper should also read: "Call me before using any of these codes! <phone number>."

calvinmorrison

it's just a further step whittling away of browsers being a "user client".

a key based approach is great. Knowing (the passphrase) and Having (the key) is a good way to authenticate.

lapcat

> Seems like vendor lock-in was the goal from the start.

Exactly. The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them. The purpose of the so-called "secure credential exchange" is once again to prevent you from directly accessing your credentials. You can go from one passkey vendor to another, but you're always locked in to one passkey vendor or another.

Any credential system that makes it impossible to write something down on a piece of paper, take it to a new computer, and login to a website is just a gateway to vendor lock-in. You can manually manage your own ssh keys but for some reason not your passkeys.

As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.

The passkey vendors took some good theoretical ideas, such as site-specific credentials and public-key cryptography, and totally mangled the implementation, making it hostile to everyone except themselves.

timmyc123

> The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them.

Care to cite this statement?

> As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.

You can use any credential manager you choose. You don't have to use Apple Passwords / iCloud Keychain.

peanut-walrus

It's an open protocol, you don't need to use any of the vendors. My Yubikey is a "passkey", so is my Flipper Zero. Keepass provides passkey support.

For the general public, they already rely on either Google or Apple for pretty much all of their digital life. Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.

lapcat

> It's an open protocol, you don't need to use any of the vendors. My Yubikey is a "passkey", so is my Flipper Zero. Keepass provides passkey support.

I don't want to use a Yubikey. It's a pain in the butt. I just want to use my Mac, with no more damn dongles.

Keepass is a vendor, and one who doesn't even have a Safari extension.

> Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.

I didn't say there was anything wrong with extending this to passkeys. The problem is the lock-in, e.g., Safari requires iCloud keychain for passkeys, but not for passwords. And there is no plaintext export/import, unlike with passwords.

Nobody can convince me that passkeys are good when I buy a Mac and use the built-in Safari but can't even use passkeys to log in to websites unless I give my passkeys to a cloud sync service or have to install some third-party "solution" (for a problem that should not exist in the first place). That experience is so much worse than passwords.

tdemin

[dead]

jmsgwd

> passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain

This is not true - browsers including Safari support passkeys managed by third-party password managers.

I'm using 1Password with browser extensions for Safari and Chrome on macOS and iOS and it works seamlessly with my passkeys, which are not stored in iCloud Keychain.

lapcat

> This is not true - Safari also supports passkeys managed by third-party password managers.

I think you know what I meant and are just being pedantic here for no good reason.

Do you think I'm unaware of 1Password? I don't want to use 1Password any more than I want to use iCloud Keychain.

Technically, pendantically, Safari "supports" anything that third-party Safari extensions support. I'm a Safari extension developer myself. But this is totally different from how Safari supports the use of passwords, which is all built in, requires no third-party software, can be local-only, allows plaintext export/import, etc.

mroche

This is obviously kicking the can down the road, but I "solve" this problem by storing passkeys in a third-party credential manager that supports them. That way I can use them on any device that I've installed the client app or browser extension on. I have this working on Fedora, macOS, Windows, and iOS.

But again, kicking the can down the road.

deltoidmaximus

Well, you can until they use the attestation feature to block your passkey manager implementation.

happyopossum

> what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain

Completely untrue, Safari on both Mac and iOS supports third-party password managers for both traditional passwords and passkeys.

pastel8739

> The purpose of the so-called "secure credential exchange" is once again to prevent you from directly accessing your credentials.

I’ll accept that the attestation parts of the protocol may have had some ulterior motives (though I’m skeptical), but not having to reveal your credential to the verifying party is the entire benefit of passkeys and hugely important to stop phishing. I think it’s disingenuous to argue that this is somehow unnecessary.

lapcat

> not having to reveal your credential to the verifying party is the entire benefit of passkeys

I think you misunderstood what I was talking about. The credential exchange protocol is for exporting passkeys from one credentials manager and importing them into another credentials manager. It has nothing to do with the relying party.

alyandon

I'm a bit of a curmudgeon about this.

Until service providers are no longer allowed to:

  1) force the type of passkey stores used (e.g. hardware vs software) when I am providing the passkey store
  2) force me to MFA (e.g. forcing touch ID, entering pin or unlock password, etc) when attempting to use a passkey
I'll continue to stick to plain old boring password + TOTP. I fully understand the security trade-offs like phishing resistance but password + TOTP is secure enough for me.

Groxx

Many/all? also need to have some form of manual input as a backup, so you're not forced to sync all your passwords to e.g. a library's computer just to log in, if your house burns down or something.

Which probably looks a lot like a password.

secabeen

The "Vendors Can Lock You Out" part is what makes passkeys entirely a non-starter for me. Especially the additional risk when someone passes away and the heirs are trying to get access to the deceased's accounts. Vendors are well known for saying "we had an agreement with Samantha, and with her death, that agreement has terminated, and no one can be given access that was not pre-designated."

jerf

That linked story is pretty horrifying too: https://hey.paris/posts/appleid/

If he can't get his account back in any reasonable amount of time what chance do I have?

(I see I missed a big HN discussion on this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46252114 - 1038 comments)

jmsgwd

Some password managers provide an offline root of trust which family members can use in this scenario. For example, 1Password tells users to print off an "Emergency Kit" which is a physical piece of paper with secret recovery codes printed on it, which they store in one or more safe places. [1]

If someone passes away, their family members can use the Emergency Kit to gain access to and use all their credentials - including their passkeys.

(The Emergency Kit is also intended to allow your to recover your passkeys and other credentials in the event you forget your master passphrase or lose all your devices.)

[1] https://support.1password.com/emergency-kit/

teeray

> "we had an agreement with Samantha, and with her death, that agreement has terminated, and no one can be given access that was not pre-designated."

It would be nice if you could use some legal apparatus to ratchet these agreements into a trust. Corps would hate it though, so it will probably be illegal to do.

dpark

It’s “illegal” in the sense that you could write whatever you want in your will but it wouldn’t be binding. You cannot force a party into a legal obligation they do not agree to.

The government can, though. I’m not sure if there’s any existing laws pertaining to transfer of or access to general accounts after death (as opposed to bank accounts which I’m pretty sure there are laws about).

My will says that my executor can access my accounts which alleviates Apple from legal risk if they do grant access but I’m pretty sure they are not obligated to do so.

Terr_

This reminds me of some past political debates around same-sex marriage, where I got very frustrated encountering people that claimed government-involvement was unnecessary because the job could be done with contracts.

Naturally, this is false. You can't "contract" the guardianship of children, you can't "contract" indirect responsibilities to allow hospital visits, etc.

shantara

Vendor lock-in a serious concern. Just reading through this KeePass issue again and seeing how much pressure the industry is trying to exert to prevent the users from being able to export their own private keys should be concerning. I come back to this discussion every time I see someone arguing in favor of passkey adoption.

>The unfortunate piece is that your product choices can have both positive and negative impacts on the ecosystem as a whole. I've already heard rumblings that KeepassXC is likely to be featured in a few industry presentations that highlight security challenges with passkey providers

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

timmyc123

Hi! I'm the commenter on that post that keeps being brought up!

I don't think requiring an encrypted backup (with a key or secret that YOU control) by default is "preventing users from being able to export their own private keys".

voidfunc

Passkey just suck, end of story. The UX for them is so bad. I have no idea how many active pass keys I have. I just have to trust the provider knows what they're doing. Sometimes my authenticator app seems to forget my pass keys which is even more annoying.

Stop the insanity.

0x457

Everyone pretends that you're force to only have 1 passkey. I use 3 "passkey managers": Passwords.app, Bitwarden, YubiKey hardware key. I usually add all 3 or just two (skipping YubiKey).

On Apple devices I get neat experience out of the box, on Linux (+Firefox) I forced to use Bitwarden because Mozilla is being Mozilla.

Never had any issues ever with passkeys.

stouset

Yep. I use Apple’s direct support which works out of the box. I also create a second passkey in 1Password. And for truly important accounts (1Password itself, Apple, Google), I have a third copy on a YubiKey stored in a safe deposit box.

eddyg

Passkeys are fantastic for the vast majority of the population. They solve oodles of problems. No more teaching ${FAMILY_MEMBER} about good passwords, password re-use, trying to explain how to use a password manager, etc. Instead: create passkey, done. Then it's seamless login whether they're on their computer, phone or tablet.

As a tech-savvy user fully aware of the underlying machinations involved with passkeys, I greatly prefer their simple, fast login experience over: username submit password submit TOTP submit, and especially over the much-worse "we've emailed you a code" login slog.

201984

It's great until they break their phone, or spill coffee on it, or just lose it, and now they are locked out of EVERYTHING with no good way to get back in.

Passwords on a piece of paper for better or worse do not have that problem.

null

[deleted]

eddyg

Only if they're not backing up their phone, which seems insane in this day and age.

And even if they're not, if they have a computer or tablet, the passkey will still be available there assuming they share an account.

You can also recover your iCloud Keychain via a designated/trusted Recovery Contact (e.g. spouse, who presumably hasn't destroyed their phone at the exact same time), or via iCloud Keychain escrow.

https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/passwords-devices-iph...

eli

Android syncs them to your Google account and iPhone to your iCloud account by default. Which isn't a perfect solution but, again, is pretty good for most people.

Barrin92

>with no good way to get back in.

which is why at the very least your email provider gives you a recovery kit to print out (the equivalent of the notebook) and if you can get back into that account you'll likely be able to get into whatever else you signed up for.

There's no difference here between passkeys and any other central storage be it a password manager or a physical notebook. If you lose that access, well you're screwed. But it always beats having hotdog123 as your password for 70 different sites.

eli

You omitted my favorite feature: virtually immune to phishing. You can't accidentally submit a passkey to a lookalike domain.

For phishing protection, passkey as a single factor is better than memorized password + TOTP/SMS two factor.

noAnswer

How does the secret jump from the PC to their phone? How do they know each other? ...does the answer involve going all-in on Apple forever?

timmyc123

Your credential manager provides this sync and backup capability. There are dozens of credential managers available that work on all platforms. You don't have to use the default one on any given platform.

Bitwarden is my personal choice.

eddyg

iCloud Keychain (or whatever the Google equivalent is). And as I said, it's a fantastic solution for the vast majority of the population (which, coincidentally, are also not Hacker News readers).

lazide

Huh? I’ve seen zero implementations that work seamlessly across computer, phone, tablet - unless they are all single platform, which I have yet to see anyone actually pull off.

timmyc123

Google Password Manager, Bitwarden, 1Password among many others.

eddyg

It's a beautifully simple experience for Apple users across all their devices.

I can't speak for other platforms; I stopped helping ${EXTENDED_FAMILY} with non-Apple questions because the crap I had to diagnose, debug and deal with for Windows and Android was worse than ${DAY_JOB}.

arjie

Password + TOTP have served me well so far. To port from device to device I just need to log into my Bitwarden account. It is unclear to me what device loss would do to a passkey and the passkey never communicates that information to me. If I set up a passkey on my iPhone, the site prompts me on my Linux desktop. I understand it's fine for people who use single platforms for everything. But as far as I can tell there is no advantage over Password + TOTP. I really hope Passkeys don't become mandatory. I only use them for sites I don't care about or when I've accidentally said yes to setting one up.

Groxx

Device loss:

If you had multiple devices set up on the site (each site must have done this individually), you just use a different device.

If you had synced your passkeys somewhere (note that the spec allows sites to block this, though I'm not aware of any actually doing so), you sync them to the new thing and log in normally.

If you did none of those, it's gone forever. Do the account recovery process, if one exists.

So it degrades to equal or worse than passwords in all cases (which cannot block backups or syncing, and you can enter them individually by hand so you're not exposing all your passwords to the device, and you can communicate them over the phone or in writing), for device loss purposes.

Restoring access in this scenario is imo one of their worst qualities.

quantummagic

It's not really passkeys that are the problem, it's trusting your passkey to a third-party. But this is still a minor part of the market today, a much bigger problem to warn people about is the "log in with your google/facebook/etc account". Where you're handing everything over to a third-party as well, because it's so easy and convenient.

Passkeys, stored in Bitwarden, give a lot of the same convenience, but without the vendor lock-in. We shouldn't be scaring people away from passkeys, when commonly used alternatives are much worse.

commandersaki

Passkey is a great avenue for hackers because they represent an optional authentication mechanism that users overloook.

jqpabc123

So in other words, Passkeys are over engineered and simply too complicated for most users.

Succumbing to lock-in can smooth some (but not all) rough edges and creates it's own restrictions and risks.

TOTP for the win --- it's the simpler practical alternative.

timhh

TOTP is really annoying IMO but at least you control it so you can make it one-factor again if it's foisted on you. I made a Chrome extension to do that:

https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/lazyotp/eoihmklnjkn...