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Ten Years of JSON Web Token and Preparing for the Future

hdjrudni

Every time I want to use a JWT, it seems like it's the suboptimal choice, so I've never found a genuine use case for them.

Most recently, I wanted to implement 2FA w/ TOTP. I figure I'll use 1 cookie for the session, and another cookie as a TOTP bypass. If the user doesn't have a 2FA bypass cookie, then they have to complete the 2FA challenge. Great, so user submits username & password like normal, if they pass but don't have the bypass cookie the server sends back a JWT with 10 minute expiry. They have to send back the JWT along with OTP to complete the login.

I figure this is OK, but not optimal. Worst case, hacker does not submit any username/password but attempts to forge the JWT along with OTP. User ID is in clear text in the JWT, but the key only exists on the server so it's very difficult to crack. Nevertheless, clients have unlimited attempts because JWT is stateless and they can keep extending the expiry or set it to far future as desired. Still, 256 bits, not likely they'll ever succeed, but I should probably be alerted to what's going on.

Alternative? Create a 2FA challenge key that's unique after every successful username/password combo. User submits challenge key along with OTP. Same 256 bit security, but unique for each login attempt instead of using global HMAC key. Also, now it's very easy to limit attempts to ~3 and I have a record of any such hacking attempt. Seems strictly better. Storage is not really a concern because worse case I can still prune all keys older than 10 minutes. Downside I guess is I still have to hit my DB, but it's a very efficient query and I can always move to a key-value store if it becomes a bottleneck.

I don't know, what's the use-case? Server-server interaction? Then they still need to share a key to validate the JWT. And probably all but the user-facing server doesn't need to be exposed to public internet anyway so why the hoopla adding JWT? I haven't looked into it much because I don't believe in this microservice architecture either, but if I were to go down that road I'd probably try gRPC/protobufs and still not bother with JWT.

harrall

Long before JWT existed, if you wanted to pass some trusted data through an untrusted channel, you would make a payload with an expiry, encrypt or sign it with your secret key, then send it. However, you would need to make up your own way to send this info. For example, if this were a website, you might dump the signed/encrypted payload into several form fields and upon receiving it back, you would verify that it was signed with your key.

Now that JWT exists, there is a standard way to do it so you don’t have to write the same boring code a bunch of times in different languages. You just have one string you pass in one field and if you tell someone else that it’s a JWT, they know how to parse it.

It’s just a standard for the solution of passing trustworthy data through untrustworthy channels for a problem that didn’t have a standard solution before. If passing data like that is not a problem for your use case, then you don’t need the tool.

gerdesj

A JWT can include claims - that's the difference: JWTs are a bit more complicated data structure out of the box. You can do authN and authZ in one go.

You can do it all via individual browser cookies but it will be complicated. However you can dump session cookies to a database and then you can do claims locally on the server and use that cookie to tie it all together.

So I think you can do it either way.

JWTs are mutually authenticated (shared secret) but cookies are not.

alisonatwork

In your scenario you could still apply additional protections to a user id after detecting X attempts of sending a forged JWT. At least you could alert on JWTs that arrive with invalid signatures. Or you could put a 2FA challenge key inside the JWT, just use the JWT as a container to hold the information you would have shared with the client anyway.

I agree that JWTs don't really do anything more than a cookie couldn't already do, but I think the use case is for apps, not web browsers. In particular apps that do raw HTTP API calls and do not implement a cookie jar. And then because most companies do "app first development", we end up having to support JWT in the web browser too, manually putting it into localstorage or the application state, instead of just leveraging the cookie jar that was already there.

We just recently had to implement an SSO solution using JWT because the platform only gave out JWTs, so we ended up putting the JWT inside an encrypted HttpOnly cookie. Seemed a bit like a hat-on-a-hat, but eh.

genghisjahn

I love JWTs between servers. Between servers and clients, you just end up remaking cookies/sessions. Strictly my experience/opinion. Glad to hear from others.

slt2021

you cant generally reuse cookies across domains, because browser controls which domain receive which cookie. Also cookies are not cryptographically signed and thus easily forgeable by the client/browser.

JWTs on the other hand allow to be used across domain, so that you can use JWT issued by your IDP on one domain, to be trusted on another domain. crypto signature helps in verifying integrity of data.

sessions are usually tied to a single backend/application server. Its hard to reuse a session data across different apps.

JWTs on the other hand allow sharing session data across different app servers/microservices.

gerdesj

"Also cookies are not cryptographically signed and thus easily forgeable by the client/browser."

My Apache webby thingies quite happily dole out encrypted cookies:

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_session_crypto.htm...

Your notes on cross site issues are also described there.

JWTs are mutually shared secret passable with nobs on - you can store loads of data in them. Cookies are more one shot and one piece of data.

gerdesj

Cookies are only controlled by the server but obviously can be negotiated for with a secret. JWTs have a mutual secret component built in and far cooler sounding ... stuff. So both ends have to trust the other and prove it with JWT and when cookies are in play, you takes your chances - you can use mutual TLS to get the same trust that JWT gives.

I have a web app that I'm doing sysops for which ended up with both. The web devs insisted on JWT and cough "forgot" about the auth bearer bit in the header because their API didn't use it. I ended up amending and recompiling an Apache module for that but to be fair, they will support it in the next version so I can revert my changes. A few db lookups in the Apache proxy JWT module I'm using and you have your claims.

On the front of that lot you have Apache session cookies generated when auth succeeds against a PrivacyIDEA instance - ie MFA.

I suppose we have cookies for authN and JWT for authZ. Cookies could do both and apart from session I'm not too familiar but it looks like claims would require multiple cookies where JWT does it all in one.

genghisjahn

I use JWTs with RSA key pairs primarily. I tell the other service to make the pair and send me the public. I never see the private. Then I can verify all their tokens with the private key.

This way I don’t have to worry about sharing the secret. It never leaves the other service.

firesteelrain

I think you meant verify with public key.

some_furry

> Then I can verify all their tokens with the private key.

Mmmm. No. You're supposed to use a public key to verify the tokens, not a private key. What library are you using that tolerates this sort of misuse?

nssnsjsjsjs

Is there an RSS feed for this blog?

90s_dev

> It’s often said that one sign of a standard having succeeded is that it’s used for things that the inventors never imagined.

It's certainly a sign of something's utility and versatility, for sure. Congrats.

vrosas

If you go back and search hacker news for any article involving JWTs or OAuth you’ll find hundreds of comments of circular arguments over what a JWT is and is not. People never seem to be able to separate the two.

90s_dev

I still don't really understand them. The last time I used them was for a client probably in 2016 or 2018, and I forgot everything I learned about them. But they have an RFC so that's pretty cool.

marifjeren

I think an easy way to think about them is it's just a json object, with some cryptographic crud glued to it that proves who created it.

methou

JWTs are just too fat, and JS users often forgets encoding is not encryption.

I've seen some news site trackers send JWT in url/header to some 3rd party tracker. Content is no surprise, my full name, and email address, violates its own privacy policy.

Otherwise it's very open and handy, from inspecting a jwt token I can learn a lot about the architectural design of many sites.

francislavoie

Paseto is better https://paseto.io/, but unfortunately OAuth forces the usage of JWT.

marifjeren

Love JWTs but I wish there was a better standard for conveying detailed and compact authorization information, for systems requiring enforcement of complex authorization rules.

We experimented once with trying to put permissions on a JWT (more complex than your popular scopes) but that makes them grow quickly. And we experimented with putting role information on JWTs but that results in re-centralization of logic.

Maybe conveying complex authorization info via a single object that gets passed around repeatedly is fundamentally a flawed idea, but if I had an identity standards wishlist that would be near the top.

Bilal_io

Oh yeah the token grows in length very quickly, we also tried using it 5 years ago to pass in roles to the client and ended up with many issues

pelagicAustral

JWTs are a vanity project of the JS community... I am still waiting for a use case that cannot be served by traditional key exchange...

firesteelrain

> JWTs are a vanity project of the JS community

JWTs are standardized (RFC 7519) and used outside the JS ecosystem. Not a vanity project

Though often overused and poorly misunderstood where simpler and more secure methods would suffice.

mdaniel

Did you mean cert exchange, because keys are just a very long password, but certs carry actual information about the holder (err, I guess pedantically of the holder with the key)

some_furry

> Did you mean cert exchange, because keys are just a very long password

My experience differs:

My private key is only 256 bits (32 bytes, which base64 encodes up to 44 characters, if you use padding). My typical passwords are 40-64 characters (unless stupid requirements force me to go shorter).

Uvix

What algorithm are you using? RSA keys are normally at least 2048 bits in length.

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nibman

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